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1 Introduction 
Sustainable development might be one of the most contested but also precious concepts 
of the past decades. Presented as an intersection between the entities environment, 
society and economy it roots back in 1987 when the Brundtland Commission first 
reported on the global environment and development. Its main intention is to promote 
intra- and intergenerational justice by a sustainable development that meets the needs 
of the present generations without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs.1 However, the familiar cliché that actions speak louder than 
words reflects the zeitgeist. Ever since the deliberation of the term sustainability by the 
Brundtland Commission, the term sustainable development has been adopted manifold 
depending on the intention it might had to serve.  As a result, the term was rather used 
to justify or beautify actions, in part contrary to the initial concept of sustainable 
development. Now, in the face of unhindered population growth, resource exploitation, 
global climate change going along with the pursuit for higher profits, cost savings and 
economies of scale the core sustainability intentions seem to be fading away.  As a result, 
the fragility of today’s world becomes obvious and worthy of protection, more than ever.  
In this context, especially corporations are increasingly identified as one of the major 
contributors to non- sustainable developments, harming the environmental and social 
intactness. Triggered by globalization and increased international competition, profit 
maximization and cost reduction were generated at the expense of environmental and 
social consciousness. These external effects and costs of unhindered growth were in 
turn born rather by the society than by the originator. Furthermore, large multinational 
companies’ operations grew increasingly outside of the controlling mechanisms of local 
legal frameworks. With increasing size and international corporate subsidiary systems 
corporations were able to increase their power. These developments further triggered 
stakeholders’ desires for more control and accountability, for a more polluter-pays-
principle. The result was the movement of the social responsibilities of the businessman, 
coining the new term Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) for the business world’s 
responsibility for a conscious business.  
 
                                                     
1  United Nations, World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), “Our common Future”, 
1987, p. 37.  
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1.1 General motivation and theoretical foundation 
Reality shows, it is not easy to convince corporations to adapt environmental and social 
conscious business methods and invest into sustainability, particularly when in many 
countries in the world almost no consequences other than loss of reputation is to be 
feared. Despite today’s public pressure for companies to sport a perfectly clean record, 
the perception that sustainability generates costs and is rather an act of altruism is still 
prevalent in the business world. The results are ‘greenwashing’ aspirations for 
marketing purposes rather than implementing sustainability in the core business of the 
company. Therefore, to understand corporate sustainability’s raison d’être one main 
question is in the centre of attention: ‘Does sustainability pay-off for corporations?’. The 
answer to this question is of great importance as it triggers momentous implications for 
practice. If environmental, social and economic conscious management would, next to a 
better image, lead to other more tangible positive effects, i.e. financial or non-financial 
benefits, then corporations would engage in sustainability voluntarily, leading to a 
domino effect. In the academic world a large stream of research focuses on the financial 
advantages of social and environmental consciousness that is on sustainable corporate 
management. This assumed relationship is outlined in the following exhibit 1.1.  
Exhibit 1.1 | Corporate sustainability – value add model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own illustration in accordance with ZIA (2015).  
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The value-add results mainly from long-term positive pay-offs of sustainable 
management and investment decisions. In the context of governance sustainability, it 
comprises the systems and processes a company utilizes, i.e. the management of the 
company according to the best management practices in order to create shareholder 
value. Good governance is strongly associated with increased shareholder trust, good 
image and due to adequate management decisions also increased financial performance. 
Concerning the second dimension, the direction of action emphasizes that companies 
add value by investing in environmental sustainability. In other words, investments in 
resource efficient production methods, recycling or up-cycling of waste, the reduction of 
hazardous emissions not only results in environmental protection, but also in lower 
dependencies on limited natural resources, increased innovativeness, cost reduction and 
thus long-term competitiveness and profitability. Furthermore, over the course of time, 
governmental initiated environmental regulations are becoming stricter. Hence, being 
able to adopt innovations at an early stage, secures future-proofness. This in turn not 
only increases the corporate image as a highly innovative company but also ensures the 
long-term survival. Lastly, also a comprehensive sustainable management concerning 
the social element has positive value-adding impacts. Good employee management 
increases staff loyalty and productivity, decreases employee turnover and rate of 
absence. Satisfied employees recommend their employer, increasing the attractiveness 
of the company for new high-potentials. Also, satisfied staff exhibits greater motivation 
and better performance resulting in value creation. The whole value-creation aspect in 
turn presents economic sustainability which is one of the duties of private businesses 
towards shareholders. The presented relationship is especially unexplored for the real 
estate sector. Though according to the OECD, the real estate and construction industry is 
one of the main contributors to the climate change. As such, the construction, operation 
and dismantling of real estate properties are responsible for 25 – 40 % of the global 
energy consumption, for about 30 % of the global raw material consumption, for about 
30 – 40 % of the greenhouse gas emissions, for 30-40 % of the global waste generation 
and for about 20 % of the global water consumption.2 Despite this prominent role, the 
sector is still under-represented in academic research studies concerning sustainability.  
                                                     
2  OECD (2003), “Environmentally Sustainable Buildings – Challenges and Policies”, Paris.  
Nelson, A./ Rakau, O./Doerrenberg, P. (2010), „Green buildings – A niche becomes mainstream”, 
RREEF Research.  
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Furthermore, with global worth of 217 trillion USD – as a comparison to get the figures 
more tangible: the world’s economy outputs 80 trillion USD – the real estate sector 
including commercial and residential property and forestry and agricultural land plays a 
key role in the global economy.3 As stated by Yolande Barnes, head of Savills world 
research: “Real estate is the pre-eminent asset class which will be most impacted by global 
monetary conditions and investment activity and which, in turn, has the power to most 
impact national and international economies.” 4  Additionally, the increasing 
institutionalization of shareholdings and the increasing global competitiveness for fresh 
capital results in investors making high demands for good corporate governance as a 
prerequisite for investments. Moreover, this investment clientele even asks for specific 
sustainable investment products, developing a market of its own. Underpinning, market 
research has found evidence that sustainability criteria are getting more and more 
important for investors. According to the Global Sustainable Investment Alliance (GSIA), 
the global sustainable investment assets have peaked to 21.4 trillion USD in the 
beginning of 2014, starting from 13.3 trillion USD in the outset of 2012, determining a 
total growth of 61 %.5 Hence, on a global scale, the proportion of SRI assets in relation to 
total managed assets in the areas covered by the study (Europe, Canada, USA, Australia 
and Asia) has increased to 30.2 % in 2014, from 21.5 % in 2012. 6 In this context, the 
relatively young real estate sector has a considerable backlog. Hence, taking these 
elaborations into account, it becomes clear that the real estate sector has a research gap 
concerning the above mentioned sustainability aspects. If research manages to find 
further evidence for sustainability driven value creation, this might trigger the private 
business to re-think and adopt sustainability measures, concluding in a better triple 
bottom line – environmental, social and governmental sustainability. Hence, this work’s 
aim is to close this research gap and find empirical evidence for the presented 
theoretical correlation with special focus on the real estate sector. By means of three 
separate articles focusing on the above presented three dimensions of sustainability, 
this work’s target is to find empirical evidence for the value-adding effects of corporate 
sustainability. In this light, particularly the real estate sector is analyzed – where 
appropriate solely. The majority of the work combines a real estate perspective view in 
                                                     
3  http://fortune.com/2016/01/26/rea-estate-global-economy/. 
4  http://fortune.com/2016/01/26/rea-estate-global-economy/. 
5
  Global Sustainable Investment Alliance (GSIA) (2014), “Global Sustainable Investment Review”, p. 7. 
6
  Global Sustainable Investment Alliance (GSIA) (2014), “Global Sustainable Investment Review”, p. 7. 
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a comparative combination with other industries or across all sectors. The following 
section presents the research questions separately for the specific articles.  
1.2 Research questions 
Since every article targets a specific aspect of the sustainability framework, this section 
provides a basic overview of the questions that are necessary to determine the specific 
research objectives of each article.   
The value contribution of sustainability reporting - an 
empirical evidence for real estate companies 
• What is sustainability reporting and what are the current tools? 
• Is reporting according to GRA guidelines accepted by the market? 
• Does the publication of sustainability reports itself lead to any value-relevant 
changes on the market or are the relevant information already priced in the share 
prices?  
• Are the information provided in sustainability reports of decision relevance for 
investors and capital markets? 
• If investors do value information on sustainability, what is the value-relevant 
magnitude of this appreciation?  
• What is the distribution of the difference in the stock price index after and before 
the event for the total sample? 
• How does the before minus after effect behave over the event window? 
• How does the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) behave over the event window? 
• How is the distribution of the cross-sectional CAR? 
• What is the significant CAR regardless the time series component and firm 
heterogeneity? 
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Management diversity and superior corporate environmental 
performance – a global longitudinal analysis with special 
evidence for real estate companies 
• What is the current state of research on gender diversity in management and 
corporate sustainability, in particular environmental sustainability performance? 
• What mechanisms and frameworks explain the positive effects of gender 
diversity in management compared to gender diversity on board level? 
• What is the magnitude of the impact on the overall environmental sustainability 
performance? 
• Which environmental sustainability dimension is effected the most by gender 
diverse management and what is the magnitude? 
• Does the real estate industry specifically profit from increased gender diverse 
management? 
• What is the effect for companies with at least 10 % female managers? 
• Are the results robust across different sectors (industry, utilities, finance & 
insurance) and different diversity measures (proportion of female employees?  
• Are the results still robust if a different regional sub-sample (EU-sub sample) is 
analyzed?  
 
Determinants of board of directors and corporate performance 
with special evidence for real estate companies 
• In what ways do board of directors’ characteristics affect the corporate financial 
performance?  
• What is the current research on the link between corporate governance and 
corporate financial performance in general as well as specifically for the real 
estate industry? 
• What is the aggregated governance quality (rating) of the real estate industry in 
comparison to other sectors (industrial sector, utilities & consumer goods and 
technology)? 
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• What is the effect of the analyzed four board characteristics on Tobin’s Q for the 
total sample, the real estate sector and the different sub-samples (industrial 
sector, utilities & consumer goods and technology)? 
• Which of the board characteristics exert the highest influence on corporate 
financial performance? 
• Are smaller companies more sensitive to changes concerning the four board 
characteristics of interest?  
• Is there ‘one governance’ concept that is relevant for all companies over all 
sectors? 
• Are the results robust for different regional sub-samples (Europe, U.S. and East & 
Asia)?  
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1.3 Course of analysis 
This section provides an overview of the course of analysis in chronological order of 
development, the publication status as well as the authorship of the three contributing 
articles. 
The value contribution of sustainability reporting - an 
empirical evidence for real estate companies 
The main purpose of this article is to examine the value contribution of sustainability 
reporting. For the first time this is undertaken with GRI data and specifically for the real 
estate sector. Thereby, the data on sustainability reports and their publication dates 
were collected manually. The event study methodology is used to determine, whether 
the event of publishing sustainability report results in abnormal stock returns. Generally, 
in a transparent market, stock prices reflect the current performance and investors’ 
expectations about the future profitability and growth of a company. Hence, abnormal 
returns as an answer to the publication of sustainability reports means that 
sustainability reports provide new information that are not yet priced in the stock prices 
and are of value-relevance for investors. Taking this into account, as a first step the 
event window is determined. This is set according to research to 106 days before and 
106 days after the release, covering 91 trading days. Followed by an initial descriptive 
analysis, determining the differences between the after publication stock price and the 
before publication stock price by setting the share price index at 100 at the event date. 
The “before minus after” approach is undertaken to get a first descriptive impression of 
the distribution of the differences across the sample. The main analysis section 
determines the cumulated abnormal returns (CAR) for a cross-sectional view, a time 
depending view and a cross-section and time independent view. For this, the abnormal 
returns are determined according to the market model as the differences between the 
actually observed return of a security in the capital market less the estimated return of 
the security over the event period. The estimated returns are calculated according to the 
market model whereby the main broad market indices of the respective countries (DAX, 
CAC, S&P, FTSE, etc.) are taken as benchmark. The thus-determined abnormal returns 
are cumulated over securities, over time and over time as well as securities and tested 
for significance.  
Authors: Nelufer Ansari, Marcelo Cajias, Sven Bienert 
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Management diversity and superior corporate environmental 
performance – a global longitudinal analysis with special 
evidence for the real estate industry 
This article aims to analyze the link between gender diversity in management and 
corporate environmental sustainability performance. This assumed positive link is 
derived from major research on board gender diversity and corporate financial 
performance. The main drawback of female directors and regulatory quotas that shall 
increase board gender diversity is tokenism. Hence, as a first step the theoretical 
argumentation is developed concluding that for the positive effects of gender diversity 
to become apparent, gender diversity on decision-making management level besides the 
board of directors is important. Furthermore, environmental sustainability is indirectly 
linked to increased financial performance. A large set of data derived from Thomson 
Reuters Asset4ESG rating is combined with financial data for the years 2002-2015 and 
processed until a panel structure is derived. As an initial step the descriptive statistics of 
different sub-samples are compared. This allows a first impression of the distribution of 
female managers and environmental sustainability quality. For the main analysis it is 
first tested whether a fixed effects or a random effects model is more suitable for the 
unbalanced data structure. In this context, the Hausman test is performed. The results 
provide evidence, that a fixed effects model is more appropriate. In order to control for 
multicollinearity which is a main problem of panel data at least the first lag of the 
dependent variable is included in the regression equation. The final lag order for a 
specific model is determined according to the included lag’s contribution to model 
enhancement. A subsequent test for multicollinearity by determining the variance 
inflation factor confirmed the procedure. Another indicator affirming the approach are 
the Durbin-Watson test results ranging around the threshold value of 2. Furthermore, in 
order to control for heteroscedasticity, the white cross-section coefficient covariance 
method is applied. In the main part, ordinary least squares regressions with fixed effects 
panel data are performed by regressing the number of female managers on the total 
environmental rating score and the four sub-ordinate pillar scores. This procedure is 
repeated for a sub-sample with at least 10 % female managers to test whether 
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increasing number of female managers enhances the effect. As a second step, the 
procedure is repeated for the real estate and construction industry specific sub-sample. 
Finally, the robustness test is performed for different diversity measures (the 
percentage of female employees) and for a non-financial as well as European sub 
samples.   
Authors: Nelufer Ansari, Sven Bienert 
Submission to: Journal of Sustainable Real Estate (JOSRE) 
Current Status: Under review 
 
Determinants of board of directors and corporate 
performance with special evidence for the real estate 
industry 
This article is based on the same data set like the previous one, but focuses instead of 
gender diversity and environment on the financial performance implications of 
corporate governance, in particular of four board of director characteristics: size of the 
board, annual meeting frequency, number of non-executive and number of independent 
board members. The financial performance indicator applied, is Tobin’s Q – a market 
based and future-oriented measure that reflects investors’ expectations about the 
company’s future performance and competitiveness. In order to get a first impression of 
the governance quality of different sectors, descriptive statistics of various sectors (real 
estate, industrial sector, utilities & consumer goods and technology) are compared with 
each other according to the four board characteristics and different aggregated 
governance measures. In particular, these aggregated governance measures are the 
overall governance rating (CGVSCORE), the board functions score (CGBF) as well as the 
board structure score (CGBS). The main intention is to find an initial evidence for the in 
academia common perception that real estate and construction companies have specific 
governance needs. Beyond this initial distributional analysis, the main part of the 
empirical work contains ordinary least squares regression analysis based on unbalanced 
panel data to determine the coefficients of interest. For this, as an initial step, the 
appropriateness of a fixed effects or a random effects model is determined. The results 
of the applied Hausman test clearly speak for a fixed effects panel data model. 
Multicollinearity is controlled for by additional consideration of lagged dependent 
variables as explanatory variables. The degree of lags results out of testing for model 
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efficiency and goodness of fit. The variance inflation factor and the Durbin Watson test 
results confirm the procedure. White cross-section coefficient covariance method is 
applied to correct for heteroscedasticity. In order to test whether there is one 
“governance concept” applicable for all sectors, the influence of board characteristics on 
Tobin’s Q is determined for the previously named sub-samples. According to previous 
research, company size in terms of the assets under management also determines 
governance needs. Hence, to test this assumption, the sample is divided into a big and a 
small sub-sample. The threshold number for this differentiation is the median of the 
total assets (3,957,001 EUR). The robustness of the results is checked with an analysis of 
different geographical sub-samples. The reason for this is that the results of sub-samples 
concerning size or sector revealed differing results. Hence, if the results also present 
sensitivity to regional distribution, clear signs are given for distortion. However, this 
could not be confirmed for all board variables of interest.   
Authors: Nelufer Ansari 
Submission to: Journal of Management and Governance  
Current Status: Under review 
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2 The value contribution of sustainability reporting - an empirical evidence 
for real estate companies 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The threats of the anthropogenic climate change, the still prevalent poverty in some 
large parts of the world, the exploitation of natural resources, the turmoil in the 
business world such as spectacular failures in the economic system have all triggered a 
process of rethinking at the level of society as well as corporations. The behaviour of 
corporations as one of the main contributors to this development got in the center of 
attention and society’s critical voices rose asking for greater restraints of firms’ 
aspirations for profit maximization. A business as usual is no longer acceptable. 
Especially, when one considers that despite worldwide efforts to reduce anthropogenic 
climate change, the global greenhouse gas emissions in CO2-equivalents increased in the 
period 2012-2013, by further 3% p.a. and amounted now around 32 gigatonnes p.a. 
marking the highest ever measured value (Munich Re, 2013).  
It is therefore not surprising that over the past two decades sustainable development 
has become one of the major challenges of globally operating companies (Melé et al., 
2006; Skouloudis et al. 2009). Thus, corporate responsibility forces companies to 
anticipate social and environmental effects in their decision-making processes and 
integrate Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) into corporate strategies (Cajias/Bienert 
2011). Hence, in accordance to the triple bottom line companies have to preserve a 
balance between social, environmental and economic objectives nowadays in order to 
meet the needs of internal and external stakeholders. However, the success of these 
efforts stands or falls with proper communication. In this context, (particularly) 
sustainability reports such as the frameworks of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) – 
as the sustainability reporting standard used worldwide – enjoy increasing popularity.    
Especially the construction and real estate industry as one of the key drivers for 
resource scarcity and climate changes bears great responsibility in promoting 
sustainable development. According to the OECD, the construction, operation and 
dismantling of buildings as well as construction works are responsible together for ca. 
25-40% of the global energy consumption, for approximately 30% of raw material 
consumption, for 30-40% of greenhouse gas emissions, for 30-40% of the waste volume 
and for 20% of global water consumption (Nelson/Rakau/Doerrenberg, 2010). The 
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United Nations even assume that considering the population growth going along with 
massive construction activities, the greenhouse gas emissions caused by the real estate 
sector could even double in the next two decades (UNEP, 2009). For the European 
Union, Nelson/Rakau/Doerrenberg (2010) figured out that the construction and real 
estate sector is responsible for 42% of the final energy consumption and for about 35% 
of the total greenhouse gas emissions. These results show clearly that the awareness of 
sustainability and a pro-active approach towards sustainable development is crucial for 
this industry and for the entire system in terms of intergenerational justice. However, 
promoting this desired “sustainable or responsible behaviour” has ever since been a 
major question among practitioners and researchers. If sustainability would only have 
been a matter of altruism, corporations would always opt for profit maximization. Thus, 
a large body of literature dedicates to analyze the impacts of corporate sustainability on 
corporate success, rejecting the hypothesis of a pure altruism among CSR-focused firms. 
In this context, the aim of this paper is to analyze by means of an event study the impact 
of sustainability reporting on listed real estate companies. By this, we want to find out, 
whether investors reward sustainability reports with higher returns and provide 
evidence for a positive impact of sustainable behaviour and the stock returns for real 
estate companies.  
2.2 Literature review  
2.1.1 Corporate Social Responsibility 
The term Corporate Social Responsibility or Corporate Sustainability has evolved to a 
major concept for companies’ contribution to sustainable development. It is undeniable 
that CSR has developed in terms of importance and significance from an irrelevant and 
rather fashionable topic to one of the most widely used concepts in the business world 
(Lee, 2008). Both concepts are interlinked and widely used though a globally accepted 
definition is still not given. The most common definition is the one presented by the 
European Commission according to which CSR is “a concept whereby companies 
integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their 
interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis” (COM 2001, 366). It further 
states that “Corporate Social Responsibility concerns actions by companies over and 
above their legal obligations towards society and the environment” in order to increase 
the companies’ competitiveness (COM 2011, 0681). Hence, CSR reveals all the 
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environmental, social and economic aspects of a company that has both a direct or 
indirect impact on the businesses (Turcsanyi/Sisaye, 2013) and its stakeholder groups 
such as employees, investors, communities and especially in the case of multinational 
corporations the broader society and environment.  
The basis for corporate sustainability is the convening of the World Commission on 
Environment and Development (also commonly known as the Brundtland Commission) 
by the United Nations General Assembly in 1983. The main aim of this initiative was to 
unite countries for pursuing sustainable development together. The 1987 released 
report “Our Common Future” characterized sustainable development as a development 
that meets the needs of present generations without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs (Brundtland Report, 1987). The Agenda 21 – a 
comprehensive action plan to promote sustainable development – was the Agreement of 
178 countries in the Earth Summit UN Conference on Environment and Development in 
Rio de Janeiro in 1992.  
2.1.2 The reporting framework on sustainability  
Corporate reporting was ever since an ideal medium for stakeholder communication. 
Traditionally, financial reporting was predominantly important to shareholders and 
potential investors. With the increased awareness for sustainability and sustainable 
investments among investors, shareholders as well as the broader society, the critics on 
corporate reporting practices became abound. The failure of annual reports or other 
regulatory files such as 10 Ks to provide detailed information on corporate’s 
environmental and social performance has been in the centre of the critics making 
information about corporate contribution to sustainable reporting inevitable. The 
solution seemed to be reporting covering the triple-bottom-line with its economic, social 
and environmental dimensions. Despite the number of companies publishing 
sustainability reports is growing in a fast pace, the presented information are lacking 
uniformity, consistency and comparability calling for a global standard in sustainability 
reporting (Dilling, 2009). Especially, since corporate reporting on sustainability is still a 
matter of voluntary commitment, the major challenge is to overcome ‘greenwashing’ and 
interpretational tendencies (Laufer, 2003; Ramus/Montiel, 2005). 
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The Global Reporting Initiative as one of the most appreciated non-profit organization 
attempted to fill this void by providing a comprehensive sustainability framework. 
Established in 1997 out of the coalition between Environmentally Responsible 
Economies (CERES) and the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), the GRI is a 
multi-stakeholder governed non-profit institution located in the Netherlands with the 
main aim to provide globally accepted standards for sustainability reporting. Hence, its 
mission is “to enhance responsible decision-making by promoting international 
harmonization in reporting relevant and credible economic, environmental and social 
performance information” (GRI, 2002). Based on a broad understanding of the triple-
bottom-line, the GRI has developed and published its first Exposure Draft of GRI 
Sustainability Reporting Guidelines in 1999. After the launch of the GRI G3 – the third 
generation of sustainability reporting framework and the publication of the G3.1 
guidelines – an update and completion of G3, with expanded guidance on reporting 
gender, community and human rights-related performance, GRI released in May 2013 
the fourth generation of its guidelines – GRI G4. Sector supplements provide guidance 
for diverse industries such as the real estate industry. 
2.1.3 Determinants of sustainable disclosure  
Though sustainability reports are not mandatory, they fulfil an accountability function 
towards stakeholder. By providing information it reduces the information asymmetries 
between the company and its stakeholders. Thus, information beyond what is available 
in the financial disclosure has evolved to an essential mean to maintain the trusting 
relationship with the stakeholders and as such the license to operate (Krajnc/Glavi, 
2005; Gilbert/Rasche, 2007; Alonso-Almeida, 2009). Beside this, there are impacts on 
different levels of the corporation. Concerning the employees, the effect is twofold. On 
the one hand, by reporting on the corporate activities regarding sustainability the 
employees get informed and have a better understanding for the reasons of specific 
actions. On the other hand, the firm’s sustainable behavior also promotes the motivation 
of the employees or can increase the attractiveness of the company for potential 
employees (COM, 2001; Weber, 2008). CSR has effects on the employees with regard to 
work-life balance, remuneration, working conditions etc. As such, CSR and reporting 
about it can help to increase the overall employee level of information about 
sustainability, satisfaction and by this the work ethics. When it comes to investors, by 
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reporting on corporate responsibility, corporations can attract socially responsible 
investors. The Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) market has reached huge volumes 
in the past few years. According to the Eurosif European SRI (2014), the market for 
socially responsible investments in Europe has grown from 13.8 billion to 16.8 billion, a 
total growth of 22 % (Eurosif, 2014). Research studies by Geczy et al. (2003) and Bauer 
et al. (2005) find out that more and more capital is invested in ethical investment funds 
proving the increasing demand for ethical investments opportunities by investors.  
Another stream of literature assumes that on corporate side, sustainability disclosure is 
a media tool that “reveals the positive and negative aspects of a firm’s strategies” 
(Cajias/Bienert, 2011). However, there are contradictionary opinions. While the study of 
600 European companies by Albers/Gunther (2010) showed that high capitalized 
companies and companies adhering to sustainability indices are more likely to publish 
social reports, Cajias/Geiger/Bienert (2012) proved that increased media presence goes 
along with increased probability for sustainability disclosure. Cajias/Bienert (2011) also 
focus on whether financial transparency determines CSR since according to them media 
visibility highly correlates with corporate size. The analysis of listed real estate 
companies showed furthermore that business complexity and financial transparency 
enhance the provision of sustainability information across Europe. 
2.1.4 Sustainable disclosure and corporate performance 
Sustainability reporting and financial performance was not subject to many studies, 
especially in the real estate industry. Murray et al. (2006) analyzed 100 largest UK 
companies (across all sectors) to find out that there is no relationship between market 
returns and corporate social and environmental disclosure. However, the longitudinal 
analysis proved a significant relationship between positive returns and high levels of 
disclosure meaning that companies with high abnormal returns are also expected to 
have higher disclosure on sustainability due to greater amount of resources that can be 
diverted to several sustainability areas. Jones et al. (2007) analyzed the value relevance 
of sustainability reporting by means of a sustainability index regressed against a wide 
range of financial and market performance metrics of 100 listed Australian companies. 
The results show a strong relationship between sustainability disclosure and a range of 
corporate financial performance metrics, such as operating cash flow to total assets, 
working capital to total assets, and capital expenditure to assets, among others. 
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Especially for the real estate sector there are to our knowledge no research studies 
analyzing the value contribution of sustainability reports. Hence, this research will fill 
the void and make a contribution to the academic research in this specific field.    
2.3 Research design  
2.3.1 Research approach 
Abnormal returns on the stock market reflect the current performance and investors’ 
expectations about the future profitability and growth of a company. These abnormal 
returns can be triggered by “events” which can be the announcement of new 
information or occurrences that are not already priced by stock prices. We focus on 
testing whether the publication of sustainability reports results in abnormal returns on 
the stock market, hence they have a positive impact on the stock value and consequently 
on companies’ long-term growth. The positive valuation of the company in terms of 
abnormal returns might be the results of the detailed and explicitly information on 
sustainability, which is provided in the (GRI-) report as it is directly connected with a 
more specific management and long-term corporate strategy. The submission and 
acceptance of a sustainability report is only successful if the company can prove the 
integration of sustainability in the corporate strategy. This is done by the submission of 
the first sustainability report. Thus, the submission of the following reports to the GRI 
provides information on the changes of the sustainability key performance indicators. 
Hence, shareholders and potential investors link sustainable corporate management 
concerning all sustainability dimensions – economic, ecologic and social – with lower 
risk and higher corporate legitimacy having also a positive effect on the long term 
corporate performance.  
Given the broad findings of previous literature, if sustainability disclosures are 
considered value-relevant to investors, we would expect higher (lower) sustainability 
disclosing entities to have relatively higher (lower) abnormal stock returns, after 
controlling for factors that can be systematically related to abnormal returns, such as 
firm financial performance and firm size (we do not control for that factors since we do 
not have a regression model). Hence, the specific research question is whether 
sustainability reports affect stock prices positively and therefore do pay off. Especially, if 
one considers the costs for preparing sustainability reports, the costs for measuring 
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sustainability performance, etc. positive results would indicate that the information on 
sustainability is of decision relevance for investors and capital markets.  
Furthermore, by using two different publication data sources – the company’s press 
release and the GRI publication database – we are able to validate our results. This paper 
is to our knowledge one of the first studies that uses the GRI-database for empirical 
studies on abnormal stock returns. Hence, a GRI conformed disclosure might be 
accepted and appreciated more widely in the market than other voluntarily undertaken 
disclosure forms, but also enables a greater visibility in capital markets. Thus, the 
second question to answer is whether the publication by GRI experiences a higher 
acceptance among shareholders and investors, hence is of higher decision-usefulness in 
relation to the traditional disclosure by companies’ annual reports. If so, this would 
imply a greater trustworthiness of GRI compared to company’s’ publication since GRI 
publishes the reports after an internal verification process.  
2.3.2 Sample description and research design 
The data used to determine the listed real estate companies disclosing sustainability 
reports was derived from the GRI database. We aggregated and screened the GRI 
reporting data room for real estate and construction companies. Thus, the initial sample 
covered 385 construction and real estate companies worldwide publishing 
sustainability reports during the time period from 1999 till 2014. Subsequently, this 
data set was matched with the real estate data room of Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
For the matching procedure it was necessary to gather the company specific ISIN 
information since the GRI list only contains the company names. Hence, the ISIN was 
researched for every company by means of Datastream and internet research. As a 
result the initial GRI long list was reduced by all non-listed companies, insolvent and 
non-operating companies as well as companies with no information applicable, resulting 
in a remaining data space of 190 listed real estate companies. For these companies, 
extensive internet research taking into account especially the corporate and GRI website 
was undertaken to find the exact publication dates of their sustainability reports. 
However, the publication date was not available for all researched companies leading to 
a reduced list of 94 companies. A further adjustment eliminating all obsolete data such 
as companies with no information on performance measures, real estate funds, etc. left a 
final sample of 89 publicly listed real estate companies.  
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Exhibit 2.1| Sample composition of listed real estate companies with 
sustainability reports since 1999 
 
 
 
 
 
The pie chart illustrates the final sample structure.  
Source: Own illustration. 
 
The data covers three continents: Europe with the largest share of 60.2 %, followed by 
North America with a share of 29.5 % and Australia with the smallest share of 10.2 % 
(exhibit 2.1). For European companies, the UK exhibits the highest share of about 15.9 
%, followed by Germany and Sweden with 8.0%, each. The North American sample 
consists of United States with 22.7 % and Canada with around 6.8 %.  For this final short 
list we started a double approach: Firstly, we used the publication data on the GRI 
website and secondly, the publication data on the companies’ homepages, i.e. the 
companys’ press release. For the time period 1999 till 2014 we identified 227 (71.2 %) 
GRI publication observations and 92 (28.8 %) corporate press releases. 
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Exhibit 2.2| The distribution of the impact of sustainability report release on 
companies’ stock price index  
 
 
 
For this analysis, the total return index of each observed real estate company was set to 100 at the event 
day - the release of their sustainability report. We then calculated the difference in the stock price index 
after and before the event for each of the 89 real estate companies. Since our investigation window is of 
106 days, we report only 12 periods. The plot shows the distribution of the differences across several 
quantiles for each of the chosen window starting in 1 day and ending in 106 days. A positive difference in 
a specific quantile indicates that the total return index was higher after the report-release compared to 
the same period of time before the report release.  
Source: Own illustration. 
 
The illustration 2.2 shows the distribution of the differences (after minus before 
sustainability report release) of the total return index for every observation on the first 
day after release, in ten days steps and on the last six days of the investigation window. 
This first simple descriptive analysis shows that the release of sustainability reports has 
a substantial impact on the total return index across the sample, considering both the 
press as well as the GRI-release date. The analysis shows that for about 70 % of the 
observations the difference in the total return index for after report release compared to 
before report release was positive. The positive effect on returns is getting more evident 
that is stronger the further you go from the event date. Thus, after 106 days almost 70 % 
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of the observations had a return index value between +0,6 and +3,7 on average. Ten 
days after the report release 90 % of all observations show a positive value of the after 
minus before total return index. This result is also a first evidence for the market 
efficiency hypothesis as new information – the release of sustainability report – is 
incorporated into the share prices shortly (2 days) after the event date 
(McWilliams/Siegel, 1997; Lloyd Davies/Canes, 1978).  
2.4 Research methodology 
2.4.1 Preliminary steps 
Fama et al. (1969) have decisively influenced the research on the impact of new, publicly 
available information on the stock prices. Ever since, event studies are an integral part of 
economic research as the main goal is to determine the effect of new information on the 
market value of a company. From this, it can be derived whether the information is of 
decision-usefulness to shareholders or not. Event studies are conducted under the 
premise that the considered capital market processes publicly available information 
quickly and (almost) completely. This premise is based on the hypothesis of efficient 
capital markets formulated by Fama (1969): „The primary role of the capital market is 
allocation of ownership of the economy’s capital stock. In general terms, the ideal is a 
market in which prices provide accurate signals for resource allocation: that is, a market in 
which firms can make production-investment decisions, and investors can choose among 
the securities that represent ownership of firms’ activities under the assumption that 
security prices at any time fully reflect all available information. A market in which prices 
always fully reflect available information is called efficient.”. This semi strict 
informational efficiency is given on the market if all publicly available information is 
displayed immediately and completely in the current market price. Overall, many 
research studies indicate that there is a latent semi-strict information efficiency in all 
major capital markets (Spremann, 2006), which is the basic assumption in event studies. 
Thus, the influence of a piece of information on corporate value can be read from the 
share price reaction upon information notice. Since discounted cash-flow methods are 
dependent on internal data as well as company individual risk perception, event studies 
provide a wide and more objective mean for the estimation of capital market reactions 
(McWilliams/Siegel, 1997). 
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The first event studies – whose methodology remains basically valid – were undertaken 
by Ball et al. (1968) and Fama et al. (1969) and essentially evaluate the impact of profit 
reports and stock splits on capital markets. More precisely, they analyze the influence of 
profit reports on the excess returns calculated according to the market model. The 
rationale behind it is that if abnormal returns were observable, they might presumably 
incorporate the information relevant for the single company. This research study’s 
application of the event study method is undertaken in accordance to the procedure 
introduced by MacKinley (1997). Generally, the method can be divided into the 
following steps:  
1. Identification of the event and event window 
2. Modeling and estimating the share price reaction  
3. Sum up and interpretation of the abnormal returns 
2.4.2 Identification of event and event window 
We define the event as the date of the publication of sustainability reports. However, we 
do not differentiate between reports compiled according to GRI G3 or G4 framework or 
sustainability reports compiled according to an own company specific framework. But 
we do consider two different release dates: firstly, the date when the report is published 
in the GRI database – hence accepted by the GRI – and secondly, the release date by the 
company via the firm’s internal press release. The most crucial research design aspect in 
event methodology is probably the issue concerning the length of the event window. The 
main reason for this is the increasing probability for overlapping or parallel events, 
resulting in biased results. Therefore, we decided for an event window of 106 days 
before and 106 days after the event in daily steps covering a total period of 91 trade 
days. This event window length seems ideal for this research and is in accordance to the 
results of McWilliams/Siegel (1997) as they analyzed different event studies on 
sustainability finding that the event periods chosen ranged symmetrically up to 181 
trading days. However, the smaller the event window is the lower the risk of 
confounding events and thus the more accurate the results. (Gebken, 2008; Peterson, 
1987)    
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2.4.3 Modelling and estimating share price reaction  
In order to assess the impact of a GRI report release on the stock price it is necessary to 
measure the (cumulative) abnormal returns. Conceptually, the event analysis 
differentiates between returns that would have been expected in the absence of the 
analyzed event (normal or expected returns) and returns that are caused by the 
respective event (abnormal returns). Hence, the abnormal return over the event period 
corresponds to the actually observed return of a security in the capital market less the 
estimated return of the security over the event period. For the firm  at the event date  
the abnormal return can be described as  
   , = , − 
,       (I) 
, where ,, , and 
,  are the abnormal, actual and normal (estimated) return 
respectively. Though this might seem trivial, among researchers it is common 
knowledge that the research outcomes depend on the proper estimation of the normal 
(expected) return. The tremendous body of models can be generally grouped into two 
categories: statistical and economic models. While models in the first category rely 
mainly on statistical assumptions, models in the second category take in addition 
assumptions regarding the investor’s behavior into account for a more precise 
estimation of the normal returns. However, research has proven that the additional 
factors do not go along with higher explanatory power resulting in an almost ceased 
usage of economic models (MacKinley, 1997). Thus, the most important statistical 
methods within the event study methodology are the simple constant-mean model and 
the prevalent market model which differ mainly in the underlying assumption of the 
behavior of asset returns. The constant mean model is based on the assumption that the 
best predictor of a company’s normal return is the company’s average security return 
prior to the event window. According to this model the normal period- return of a 
security  can be described as 
 , = , − 
, = ∑ ,

 + ,     (II) 
Hence, the normal expected return 
, of security  is equal to the average return, 
meaning it is constant during the estimation period as well as the event window. , is a 
noise term for security  , with an expected mean , = 0 and variance , =
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, . Despite its simplicity the constant-mean model is expected to generate similar 
results as more complex models (Brown/Warner, 1985; Brown/Weinstein, 1980).  
One of the most prevalent approaches in event study methodology is the market model 
since evidence has suggested that the market model will perform in most circumstances 
as well as if not better than any other alternative (Armitage, 1995). Generally, for 
statistical models it is required that asset returns are jointly multivariate normal, 
independent and identically distributed over time as explained by Campbell et al., 1997. 
Consequently, the normal return for any given security  is according to the market 
model defined as  

, =   + !"#, + ,      (III) 
, whereby 
, and #, are the estimated normal period-  returns of the asset  and the 
market return $  respectively. ,  is the error noise term with , = 0  and 
, = , . The basic idea of the model is the division of the normal return into two 
components: In a particular market driven return component and a security specific 
component, meaning a firm-specific depending return. Hence, the market model 
incorporates the security's sensitivity to market movements into the prediction of the 
normal return and relates the return of any given asset to the return of the market 
portfolio (MacKinley 1997). This asset specific sensitivity to the market movements is 
measured by the estimated regression via OLS over an estimation window of 91 trading 
days. In order to determine the market return a benchmark is required. Brown and 
Warner (1980) indicate that the choice of the benchmark has a significant effect on the 
results of the event study. We use for the determination of the market return the main 
broad market indices of the respective country such as DAX, CAC, S&P, FTSE, etc. The 
abnormal returns  , for a security  at time  are calculated as follows:  
 , = , − 
, =	, −	  − !"#,.    (IV) 
2.4.4 Aggregation and testing statistics for the significance of abnormal returns  
After calculating the abnormal returns  , for all  securities over the event window , 
it is necessary to aggregate these abnormal returns in order to test for their significance 
and if inferences can be drawn. By the concept of cumulative returns, multi period event 
windows can be accommodated and therefore, in order to test for significant abnormal 
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returns the & × ( matrix containing the  , can be aggregated firstly over time across 
the event window , cross-sectionally across each company  or lastly across both 
company  and time  (Fama et al., 1969). The Cumulative Abnormal Return ()*) 
aggregates the abnormal returns for each company over time. This is within the event 
window beginning in + and ending in + as follows:  
  
)*,+, +- = ∑  ,./      (V) 
 
with 
 
 0)*,+, +-1 = ∑ ,-./     (VI) 
 
 
In other words, the cumulative abnormal return is the sum of all abnormal returns 
during the event window. The calculation of  0)*,+, +-1eliminates overlapping 
events and sustains the assumption of uncorrelated abnormal returns between the 
distinctive observations. The mean abnormal returns of all companies at each point of 
time over the event window are calculated as:   
 
 = 2∑  ,
2
      (VII) 
with 
 
 01 = 2.∑ 
2
      (VIII) 
 
 
Hence, the cumulative average abnormal return   is calculated as the sum of all 
securities’ abnormal returns divided by the number of observed securities. This is 
similar to an equal weighting of the N securities. Hence after each period t, the securities 
are redistributed, meaning that securities with higher return are sold in the following 
period to buy securities with relatively low return. The aggregation of the cumulative 
abnormal returns over time and securities, that is, the impact of the event over the event 
window, is calculated the following way:  
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0)*,+, +-1 = 	 2∑ )*


2
 ,+, +-	    (IX) 
 
with 
 
 0)*,+, +-1 = 2.∑ 
2
 ,+, +-     (X) 
 
 
Given that the abnormal returns are expected to be normally distributed, it is possible to 
conduct a test under the null hypothesis of zero mean. The testing procedure includes 
the calculation of the test statistics, the comparison of it to the assumed distribution 
under the null hypothesis that the average abnormal return is equal to zero. Mainly, the 
following null hypotheses are tested: 
 
Φ =	 CAR6,T, T-
8σ,CAR6,T, T--
∼ N,0,1- 
 
 
The null hypothesis Φ tests whether the cumulative abnormal return for every 
security  is significantly different from zero ( = 0). 
 
Φ =	 AR
6 − 
8σ,AR<-
∼ N,0,1- 
 
 
The null hypothesis Φ tests whether the average abnormal return at a specific time 
period  is significantly different from zero.  
 
Φ= =	 CAR
,T, T- − 
8σ,CAR6,T, T--
∼ N,0,1- 
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The last null hypothesis tests for the whole matrix of cumulative abnormal returns 
whether it is statistically significantly different from zero or not. 
2.5 Empirical results 
The prevalent significance test for event study methodology is the t-test with the 
assumption of uncorrelated and equally distributed residuals. The t-test can be 
undertaken not only to test the significance from zero but also to test on higher values, 
also called power or objective value μ. The power μ addresses the issue of likelihood of 
rejecting the null-hypothesis for a specific value of abnormal return associated with the 
event. The economic plausible abnormal return range is driven from the descriptive 
analysis which indicated that the difference in total return index from after minus before 
sustainability report release was around 3.5 index points. Hence the objective values to 
be tested for are set from 0 % to 5 % in 0.5 % steps.  
Assuming a one sided t-test under the null of CARs greater than the respective objective 
values, the results of the hypotheses Φ are illustrated in exhibit 2.3. 
Exhibit 2.3| Statistical significance of CAR by reasonable range of objective values 
across time  
 
 
The null hypothesis to be tested is >?: ) > 0; that is, the event of releasing sustainability reports has a 
impact on corporate share returns across the event window +	to +. For this the abnormal returns of the 
89 companies of the sample have been aggregated over the event window for all companies in t+1, t+2 + 
…+ t+91 days after the sustainability report release. The ordinate indicates the p-values for rejecting the 
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null. Hence, each line represents the p-value for the null-hypothesis given an objective return being 
greater than the indicated economically reasonable abnormal return range between 0 % and 5 % in 0,5 % 
steps. The subsequently undertaken t-test shows that the results are significantly different from zero. 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
Each of the lines in exhibit 2.3 shows the p-value of rejecting the hypothesis that 
cumulative returns are greater than the respective objective values in relation to the 
days after the release of the sustainability report. Hence, for example the hypotheses 
that the CAR is greater than 1.0 % can be rejected after 70 days of the report release 
date. The hypothesis that the CAR over time is higher than 3 % can be already rejected 
after 29 days after the sustainability report release. In other words, 70 days after the 
release of a GRI-report listed real estate companies exhibit a cumulative abnormal 
return of at least 1 % and of at least 3 % after almost 30 trading days. 
These results can be confirmed not only over time but also by the evidence from the t-
test Φ for the cross-sectional sample. Exhibit 4 illustrates the results of the t-test for the 
statistical significance of the cumulated returns by the objective values 0 % to 5 % in 0.5 
% steps for all listed real estate companies.   
 
Exhibit 2.4| Statistical significance of cumulated abnormal returns for a range of 
objective values across companies 
 
Undertaking the t-test across the 89 companies was initiated with the cross-sectional aggregation of the 
cumulative abnormal returns for the sample. The objective value range is 0 % to 5 % in 0.5 % steps. The 
ordinate shows the p-values and the y-axis the share of the companies.  
Source: Own illustration. 
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Each line in the exhibit 2.4 shows the p-value of rejecting the hypothesis that firm’s 
cumulative returns are greater than the respective objective values sorted by the share 
of companies. In other words, for almost 90 % of the companies the hypothesis that the 
release of a GRI-report leads to CARs below 2.5 % cannot be rejected. In contrast, only 
10 % of the real estate firms show a statistical significant CAR above 5 %, which is not 
likely in in view of the results exposed in the descriptive statistics. However, almost 75 
% of the observed firms show a significant CAR of at least 3 %. These results emphasize 
the importance of information on sustainability activities as an active part of firms’ 
strategy to both internal and external stakeholders, which result in increased growth 
expectations by investors and capital markets.  
Finally, we present the empirical results for the entire sample regardless of the 
individual heterogeneity or time-series component, i.e. the t-test for the null-hypothesis 
Φ=. Over the entire sample, the hypothesis that the release of sustainability reports has 
no influence on corporate value can be rejected at all conventional significance levels. 
More precisely, the result holds up to an objective value of CAR below 2.0 % for the 
entire sample and confirms that the inclusion and communication of sustainability 
strategies has a significant impact on stock returns, based on a sample of 89 listed real 
estate companies and 318 events. 
Exhibit 2.5| The significance of cumulative abnormal returns across time and 
company 
Objective Value 
All Sample 
T-Value P-Value 
0.0 % 23.992 0.00 
0.5 % 20.155 0.00 
1.0 % 16.317 0.00 
1.5 % 12.480 0.00 
2.0 % 8.643 0.00 
2.5 % 4.805 0.17 
3.0 % 0.968 1.00 
3.5 % -2.869 1.00 
 
The t-test for the 318 observations of the 89 companies over the event window of 106 days. The p-values 
show significance at all level, thus the one-sided null-hypothesis of no impact can be declined. The 
objective values or power test the significance of the indicate value of the abnormal returns.  
Source: Own illustration. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
The inclusion of sustainability aspects into core firms’ strategy is becoming more and 
more the rule rather than the exception, especially in the real estate industry as it 
accounts for a large part of the final energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions 
worldwide. In this context, the efficient communication of sustainability strategies and 
efforts is normally undertaken by sustainability reports, based mainly on the 
international regulatory framework of the Global Reporting Initiative, GRI. In a market, 
in which information is priced efficiently, additional information on companies’ long-
term strategies should reduce asymmetries between the company and its stakeholders 
and lead to stronger valuation. If the release of sustainability reports provides additional 
information, then we should expect a positive impact on corporate value. Based upon 
these fundamentals, the paper analyzes the impact of sustainability reports on corporate 
value. The descriptive and empirical analyses provide significant evidence for the value 
contribution of sustainability reports. Specifically, we reject the hypothesis that 
sustainability reports have no impact on the market value of listed real estate companies 
and establish a robust increase in abnormal returns of at least 2 % for about 75 % of the 
listed real estate companies. This positive effect is robust even when considering 
individual and serial heterogeneity into the statistical models. Hence, the positive results 
on the empirical level provide evidence that sustainable reports convey information 
useful for company (e-)valuation. They provide highly significant results for the market 
efficiency hypothesis and at the same time that the real estate market is efficient in the 
sense that new information are incorporated into the share prices within a short event 
window.  
Considering the costs of preparation sustainability reports, the results of this research 
prove the payoff of such efforts. Therefore, investments in corporate sustainability can 
also be seen as an investment in the corporate performance as corporate sustainable 
behavior is rewarded by the market with higher stock values. Thus, the presented 
results could be a trigger for further sustainability efforts of the real estate sector. 
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3 Management diversity and superior corporate environmental performance 
– a global longitudinal analysis with special evidence for real estate 
companies 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The global fragility is more than ever obvious in today’s world of accelerating 
anthropogenic climate change, resource scarcity, and global financial and political 
interdependencies. As a result, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) flourished to one 
of the key challenges of today’s society and business world, remaining at the forefront of 
public, political and corporate agenda. In particular, environmental sustainability is by 
far the most important CSR pillar with direct impacts on livelihood. Especially, sectors 
with high environmental impact like the real estate industry play a prominent role: 
According to an OECD study, the real estate and construction sector is one of the main 
determinants of resource scarcity and advancing climate change. The sector is 
responsible for 25 – 40 % of global energy consumption, about 30 % of resource 
consumption, 30 – 40 % of waste generation and 20 % of global drinking water 
consumption (OECD, 2003). Furthermore, population growth triggers construction 
activities and results in a progressively tightened environmental problem. As a result, 
the United Nations predict a doubling of greenhouse gas emissions caused by 
construction activities (UNEP, 2009). Hence, it is certainly no big surprise that over the 
last decades, a holistic sustainability approach – that is the simultaneous consideration 
of all three sustainability dimensions: environmental, social and economic/governance – 
and in general sustainable development have grown to one of the major challenges for 
business world (Melé et al., 2006; Skouloudis et al., 2009). At the same time, investors 
increasingly consider sustainability in their investment decisions, resulting in 
disinvestments in carbon intense sectors and increasing volumes of Socially Responsible 
Investments (SRI) (UNEP, 2009; Leaton et al., 2013; GSIA, 2014; Schuwerk and Weber, 
2015). As such, in the past two years the global SRI market experienced strong growths. 
In relative terms, the proportion of sustainable assets rose from 21.5 % to 30.2 % of the 
professionally managed assets. In absolute terms, global SRI investments rose from 13.3 
trillion USD at the beginning of 2012 to 21.4 trillion USD at the beginning of 2014, 
marking an increase of 61 % (GSIA, 2014). Also, other research studies provide evidence 
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that the demand for SRI is rapidly growing, i.e. the proportion of capital invested in 
ethical funds has increased tremendously (Geczy et al., 2003; Bauer et al., 2005). 
Despite the increasing importance of environmental sustainability, in practice, there are 
large differences between companies concerning corporate environmental sustainability 
performance. Gender diversity is one of the potential reasons for these divergences 
addressed in research. In particular, empirical evidence predominantly focuses on the 
sustainability impacts of gender-diverse-board-of-directors. The debate is based on the 
perception that female board members affect CSR and financial performance by 
influencing the corporate governance. Underpinning, early voices of the stakeholder 
theory such as Freeman (1984, 2004) or Cornell and Shapiro (1987) argue that the 
corporate upper echelon is obliged to satisfy the needs of all stakeholders in order to 
increase firm value. According to this stakeholder maximizing view, corporations are 
suggested to align the managements’ interests with those of its stakeholders in order to 
achieve value maximizing goals. Thus, a heterogeneous board can reflect the diverse 
stakeholders’ needs and disregarding these needs might result in reputational as well as 
financial losses. Another rationale goes further, putting emphasize on board 
effectiveness that in turn is accomplished by a diverse rather than homogenous board 
composition. In the broadest sense, a diverse board comprises individuals with differing 
backgrounds, sets of experiences, gender, knowledge, age, status etc. The combination of 
these characteristics is assumed to promote effective group dynamics and decision-
making processes. Since women are attributed caring traits and higher consciousness 
for sustainability, they might increase the awareness for and promote decisions in favor 
of higher sustainability, when serving on the board of directors. As a result, this gender 
parity is assumed to increase the board’s effectiveness concerning CSR (Harjoto et al., 
2015). 
However, this is only one stream of argumentation praising the positive impacts of 
gender parity. The other main argumentation line is based on the perception that 
women should be on the board of directors out of ethical and equality reasons. Although, 
in the past decades the gender gap in educational attainment and achievement could be 
closed, highly qualified and experienced women are still underrepresented in top 
positions. For example, in the U.S. about 50 % of the law school and up to 30 % of the 
MBA graduates are women, however, in 2011, only 16 % of the board members were 
female (Azmat, 2014). Accordingly, from a policy perspective, gender quotas will be 
needed if companies do not implement changes in top positions voluntarily. This heated 
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debate of the parties for and against legislatively determined female board quotas is the 
reason why the whole subject becomes difficult and remains one of the most 
controversial aspects of board composition in the public and business world. As such, in 
the past decade, there was a strong impetus in various countries in the world to increase 
gender diversity in board rooms of publicly traded corporations. Triggered by dedicated 
legislative initiatives around the world, numerous attempts were implemented in order 
to increase the pressure for higher board gender diversity. For Europe, the European 
Commission proposed the introduction of a mandatory female board quota of 40 % for 
the position of non-executive directors in 2012 (European Commission, 2012). However, 
the measures of promoting board gender diversity vary considerably among countries. 
The strictest regulations are to find in Norway, where the government introduced a 
mandatory quota of 40 % for women on the board of directors in 2006. Also other 
countries like France, Spain and Belgium followed this example. While Italy and Belgium 
set a minimum gender quota of 30 % to be realized by 2015 and by 2019, respectively, 
the French government determined in 2011 a minimum of 20 % female board members 
to be reached by 2014 and a quota of 40 % by 2017. While some countries like UK or 
Spain prefer a voluntary approach, in others like France and Italy, non-compliance is 
followed by sanctions. Also, besides European borders, there is a broad agreement on 
the desirability of gender diversity in board rooms. As such, mandatory as well as 
voluntary initiatives can be found: For instance, in India and Israel companies are 
required to have at least one woman on each board room. In Malaysia, 30 % female 
board members are to be fulfilled for new appointments. For the UK and the U.S.A. 
mandatory requirements do not really work, which is why they are trying to meet the 
issue by heated debates, causing policy makers to introduce some measures open to 
voluntary participation. Surprisingly, in these countries the percentage of female board 
members increased without legislative pressure. However, it is not clear, whether in 
these cases, the public pressure and/or the international competitiveness for investors 
initiated the process of rethinking and adaptation.  
Nevertheless, one of the major problems of gender quotas and forced board gender 
diversity remains tokenism since in practice; it is still very rare for firms to have more 
than one female board member – the so called token woman effect. Furthermore, quotas 
on gender mainly refer to non-executive board positions. Also, in practice women are 
still more likely than men to have outside director positions (Post and Bayron, 2015; 
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Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Though, these directors are having a range of controlling 
and advising functions, the active management is still a predominantly male domain.  
Concerning research, a bulk of scientific work focuses on the financial performance 
implications of board gender diversity, however, the results remain ambiguous. Also, 
when it comes to sustainability effects of diversity, the research output is still scarce. 
Hence, there is not only a research gap concerning the effects of board gender diversity 
on corporate CSR performance but also a gap on circumventing the effects of tokenism, a 
potential field for bias. This study is devoted to the environmental sustainability impacts 
of gender diversity on board and subordinated management level with focus on three 
new dimensions of sustainability determinants: 1) Gender diversity in decision-making 
management positions, 2) real estate industry as highly environmental impact sector 
and 3) first time analysis of 4 dimensions of environmental sustainability – it is to our 
best knowledge the first of its kind. By focusing on gender diversity in decision-making 
management levels, distorting effects of tokenism are circumvented. Furthermore, using 
a broad panel data set of 3,528 and various diversity and sustainability scores of the 
Asset4ESG rating by Thomson Reuters, the analysis results show positive impact of 
female management on corporate environmental sustainability performance. In 
particular, gender diverse management promotes environmental product innovation 
and especially for the real estate and construction industry, it supports corporate 
emission reduction. Thereby, the effect of management diversity is by far higher than 
the effects of board level diversity, underpinning the assumption of tokenism.  
The remaining of the paper is structured the following way: The first section provides 
some theoretically oriented background information on sustainability and diversity 
followed by the hypotheses and a sample as well as a methodical description. The 
hereafter following section focuses on the sample statistics and leads to the discussion 
of the results. Finally, robustness check and conclusion mark the end of the paper. 
3.2 Literature review 
3.2.1 CSR and sustainable development 
The concept of Corporate Social Responsibility roots in the 1987 evolved idea of 
sustainable development by the Brundtland Commission (formally the World 
Commission on Environment and Development). Therein, the Commission defined 
sustainable development as a development that meets the needs of the present 
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generations without compromising the ability of future ones to meet their own needs 
(Brundtland Report (1987)). The corporate contribution to sustainable development 
can be outlined by the CSR concept that is most commonly defined as “a concept whereby 
companies integrate social and environmental concern in their business operations and in 
their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis” (COM 2001, 366). Further, 
CSR involves actions that are over and above the corporate legal obligations towards 
environment and society (COM 2011, 0681). In a nutshell, CSR comprises a company’s 
environmental, social and economic activities that have direct or indirect effects on the 
corporate business as well as its stakeholders (Turcsanyi and Sisaye, 2013).  
Environmental sustainability is an important dimension of CSR whose disregard such as 
growing global energy consumption or increasing air pollution by partly unrestricted 
CO2 emissions has hazardous impacts on the environment (e.g. melting ice caps, 
droughts and floods, resource scarcity etc.) that are already in evidence. Especially, 
multinational corporations and companies with high emissions are identified as the 
main contributors to these developments. Moving into the focus of societies’ attention, 
critical voices asked increasingly for greater restraints of unelected corporate growth 
aspirations. This growing public and political awareness for sustainability has a 
signaling effect for corporations to consider the requirements and needs of these 
stakeholders. Creating and maintaining a relationship with these groups is essential for 
building a competitive advantage in business (Jensen, 2001, 2002; Fisman et al., 2005; 
Baron, 2009; Harjoto et al., 2015). Ignoring these aspects and pursuing a strategy of 
business as usual would mean a threat to the survival of the company, especially, the 
nowadays excellent communication tools allow for instant information of stakeholders 
and for taking the polluter into account almost immediately. Also, from an economic 
point of view, the consequences of management failures are partly disastrous for the 
shareholders when their invested capital is literally burned down. A prominent example 
for such failures threatening the survival of the company is the emission scandal by 
Volkswagen AG, when shareholders had to face a loss of almost one-third in VW shares 
going along with massive compensation payments of more than 15 billion USD only in 
the US.7 Other stakeholders such as consumers lost trust in the company leading to a 
slump in sales numbers of VW vehicles. Again the consequences of declining corporate 
revenues as well as lawsuits by environmental authorities have to be borne by the 
shareholders. 
                                                     
7  https://www.ft.com/content/336c4db0-8874-11e6-8cb7-e7ada1d123b1. 
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Consequently, initially underestimated as a rather fashionable term, sustainability has 
gained importance and weight as one of the most popular concepts in the business 
world (Lee, 2008) with direct and indirect links to financial performance (Waddock and 
Graves, 1997; Flammer, 2015).  
3.2.2 Theory and practice of gender diversity 
The reason why gender diversity is en vogue roots in the conviction that gender diverse 
teams promote more efficient decision-making processes by providing a greater variety 
of ideas, values, perspectives and knowledge bases. It is assumed that these activities 
result in higher financial as well as Corporate Social Responsibility performance. 
However, this diversity issue remains subject to highly controversial debates. One major 
stream argues for gender diversity as the right thing to do from a political, ethical and 
rather equal-rights-oriented perspective. The other side of the debate advocating gender 
diversity from a value increasing perspective, argue that gender parity has a number of 
positive impacts on corporate governance, and accordingly, on the effectiveness of 
board of directors as a central corporate governance mechanism. First, women would 
provide a greater variety in opinions and views, hence leading to better decision-making 
processes in management teams. Therefore, diversity would also increase the creativity 
and innovation of the board (Carter et al., 2003). Also, gender diverse boards might be 
more effective leaders because homogeneous boards could suffer from a narrow view on 
the environment, future trends and challenges as well as sustainability. Furthermore, in 
contrast to homogenous groups, diverse groups might ask questions or be more 
courageous to contradict decisions and by this increase effective management 
monitoring (Carter et al., 2003). Besides, women on the board may improve the 
relationship management with important key stakeholder groups such as customers and 
employees, as been stated in a research study by Brammer et al. (2007). 
Concerning legislative practice, recently, corporate governance codes in various 
countries mandated publicly traded corporations to adopt board practices related to 
diversity and to disclose these information according to the comply or explain principle, 
i.e. whether and how these board diversity requirements are implemented in the 
company. For example, the Higgs report (2003) in the UK states that gender diverse 
boards might increase board effectiveness and promote the implementation of diverse 
board structures. Other European countries like Norway lead the way by introducing a 
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mandatory 40 % female gender quota for all listed companies from 2008 on. Spain 
followed this example and also determined that all publicly listed companies must abide 
by 2015, 40 % female board directors. Also in Germany, the topic of obligatory gender 
quotas was debated controversially, resulting in a female director quota of 30 % (Credit 
Suisse Research Institute, 2014). Currently, the German DAX companies have on average 
21 % female board directors. However, the business practice has shown that from a 
global perspective, in 2013 only 6.9 % of all companies have more than 30 % female 
board members. The regional comparison provides evidence, that Europe has the 
highest diversity with 19 % of the companies having more than 30 % female employees 
on board level followed by North America with 6 %. The lowest diversity can be found in 
LATAM countries (Credit Suisse Research Institute, 2014).  This research study has also 
analyzed the impact of quotas in promoting higher gender diversity. The results show 
that the impact of quotas only remained within the borders of corporate board rooms. In 
fact, gender quotas are rather driving ‘tokenism’ instead of increasing management 
quality and hence miss the target. Therefore, the following section determines how 
gender diversity despite board level quota could impact on corporate sustainability 
performance.    
3.2.3 The role of diversity in CSR performance 
In contrast to ‘greenwashing’, the main aim of CSR is to align a company’s business 
purpose, i.e. its core business with its social, environmental and governance activities. 
According to common opinion, an effective board is also important from a sustainability 
point of view, since it pursues the implementation of stakeholders’ sustainability 
aspirations by monitoring managerial actions and intervening with corrective actions, if 
necessary. Hence, for the value maximizing implementation, the effective group-dynamic 
and decision-making of the board of directors plays a major role. In turn, these desired 
team-outcomes are depending on characteristics and expertise of individual board 
members. According to Robinson and Dechant (1997) “attitudes, cognitive functioning, 
and beliefs are not randomly distributed in the population, but tend to vary systematically 
with demographic variables such as age, race, and gender”. Thus, female directors can 
increase the board independency and in accordance with the agency theory, 
independent board members are better monitors. This good governance – also a highly 
appreciated and demanded investment criterion by investors (McKinsey, 2002) – is in 
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turn an undeniable positive criterion for corporate performance. Furthermore, female 
directors are assumed to have broader interest in philanthropy and community related 
activities (Groysberg and Bell, 2013) that have positive impacts on the promotion of 
corporate sustainability.  
However, this is only one side of the coin: Increasing the number of women on board 
level and ignoring the gender diversity of management teams in middle and lower 
management does not necessarily increase shareholder value, since one of the severe 
problems in the discussion on board gender diversity remains tokenism (Branco and 
Patterson, 1999; Credit Suisse Research Institute, 2014). Aggravating, it is not only the 
tokenism of having just one female board member – according to Kramer et al. (2007) 
critical mass theory, a threshold number of at least three female board members triggers 
better corporate performance – but also the tokenism of having gender parity on board 
level but insufficient female representation in key middle and lower level management 
positions. Hence, it can be concluded that in neither case, the praised positive impacts of 
gender parity can be realized.  
Furthermore, in order to maximize the positive impacts of sustainability, the 
implementation of the main corporate sustainability strategy should be in a first stage a 
top-down process and one of the essential duties of the corporate management from 
senior management to lower level management/first line supervisors as presented in 
the following management and diversity pyramid (exhibit 3.1): 
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CEO, COO, 
President
Senior 
Management
Middle Management
First Line Supervisors
Operative Level: Non-Supervisory Individual 
Contributors
• Development of the long-term ‚Vision & Mission‘, 
integrating CSR in the core business; CSR leadership role 
model; CSR supervision by supervisory board/non-
executive members of the board of directors.
• Development and monitoring of strategic plans 
considering CSR aspects. 
• Management of day-to-day CSR operations. 
• Coordination of (CSR) work/action plans among functional 
areas with direct report. 
• Day-to-day supervision of CSR-implementation; training 
and coaching of employees, CSR motivation, CSR-
performance appraisal.
• Application and implementation of CSR goals in day-to-day 
actions.  
 
Exhibit 3.1| CSR implementation and management level 
The implementation of sustainability is a top-down process in the company. Gender diversity on all 
management levels can increase the effectiveness of the implementation process and consequently, the 
sustainability performance of the whole company.   
The reason why the number of female managers makes a difference is that with increasing number of 
women in important, decision-making management levels, the management teams get diverse 
perspectives as well as opinions and break down the all-male communication patterns. This possible 
positive effect is undermined double-tokenism-effect: Firstly, having one female board member and 
secondly, having gender parity on board level but lacking women on subordinated management levels. 
Both results in tokenism with its effects such as the minor gender – mainly women – not speaking out or 
holding back critics. Hence, the problem with tokenism is that it prevents women from having actively an 
impact on team and in turn on corporate sustainability performance.  
 
 
Source: Own illustration in accordance with ZIA (2015).   
The implementation of sustainability starts with the board of directors setting up the 
overall corporate sustainable ‘Vision & Mission’ while being supervised and advised by 
non-executive and supervisory board members. On this basis, the senior management 
level formulates the long-term corporate strategy, which in turn is broken down into 
short-term operational CSR-goals and action plans. The implementation thereof is 
coordinated by the middle management. The first line supervisors in turn oversee the 
day-to-day realization of these CSR targets and also coach and motivate employees to 
perform according to these goals. Hence, the proper execution of CSR goals set up by the 
corporate top management are in fact implemented and controlled by managers in 
senior and middle management and first line supervisors. Consequently, considering the 
gender diversity debate and the female board level quotas, it is quite obvious, that the de 
facto implementation of CSR board level targets are up to the subordinated management 
levels. Therefore, the sole number of female board members is mostly seen as tokenism 
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as long as important decision-making positions are all-male dominated. The important 
factor for CSR integration is the number of female managers in the senior, middle and 
lower management. Therefore, the coefficient effect of the regression results is expected 
to be higher compared to board gender diversity. Underpinning, the Credit Suisse 
Research Institute has shown empirically that especially in countries with board room 
gender quotas, the gap between board level diversity and following management 
diversity was the highest (Credit Suisse Research Institute, 2014).  
3.2.4 Research results on diversity and sustainability  
There is a bulk of research on board composition and financial performance (e.g. Carter 
et al., 2003; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Johnson et al., 2013), and sustainability and 
financial performance (CSR reduces the cost of capital: Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Cheng et al., 
2014 or CSR reduces the idiosyncratic risk: Luo and Bhattacharya, 2006; Oikonomou et 
al., 2012) the literature on board gender diversity and corporate sustainability 
performance is still scarce and ambiguous in results. One of the few studies in this 
context is undertaken by Ferrero-Ferrero et al. (2013). The authors have analyzed for 
the year 2009 and a total sample of 146 companies (UK, Germany and France) whether 
board diversity enhances the integration of ESG (Environmental, Social, Governance)-
aspects in management systems. Thereby, generational differences are measured by 
dividing the board members into three age categories: Veterans (1922-1942), Baby 
Boomers (1943-1960) and Generation X (1961-1981). Individuals of each category are 
expected to be determined by the generational depending characteristics. Also, the 
authors measure this diversity according to the Blau’s index for heterogeneity. Using the 
Asset4ESG rating, the results show that generational diversity can increase the 
integration of ESG aspects in the corporate management system.  
From the stakeholder perspective, Hafsi and Turgut (2012) argue that diversity is even 
desired by customers and other broad stakeholders, because a diverse management 
might have greater sensitivity to stakeholders’ interests. Also Harjoto et al. (2015) base 
their research study on the stakeholder theory according to which, the corporate 
management is required to satisfy stakeholders’ needs. By this, the authors focus on 
diverse boards’ decision-making concerning the engagement in CSR activities. In this 
context, the variable board diversity is measured by constructing the following seven 
diversity indices: gender, race, age, tenure, outside directorship, power and expertise 
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using Blau’s index of heterogeneity. The sample comprises 1,489 U.S. firms over a time 
period of 12 years from 1999 – 2011. The results using the MSCI KLD CSR Rating in six 
areas: community, employee, environment, product, human rights and corporate 
governance, provides evidence for the stakeholder theory by finding positive 
correlations between board diversity and a greater number of CSR strength and negative 
correlations between board diversity and a fewer number of CSR concerns. Hence, the 
authors conclude that diverse boards pay higher attention to and provide greater 
monitoring of CSR performance. Consequently, board diversity increases the strengths 
and reduces the concerns. Especially, the diversity elements gender, tenure and 
expertise exercise the greatest influence on sustainability activities of corporations. The 
results also showed that greater board diversity has a positive effect in particular on the 
CSR components community, environment, product and corporate governance. 
Concerning the individual diversity elements, the analysis found further evidence, that 
especially the diversity elements tenure and expertise have a minimizing effect on CSR 
concerns. Based on a sample of 126 U.S. companies over a period of 5 years, Boulouta 
(2013) also examines the impact of board gender diversity on corporate social 
performance approximated by the KLD sustainability rating. The results indicate that 
diversity on board level has a significant negative impact on the ‘concerns’, i.e. the higher 
the gender diversity the lower the negative social practices of a company. Furthermore, 
Harjoto et al. (2015) suggest, that the CSR-strengths increasing and CSR-concerns 
decreasing effects of board diversity are especially greater for companies in more 
competitive markets and for companies that are active in the consumer goods oriented 
industry.  
In a most recent study for the U.S., Landry et al. (2016) find evidence that the higher the 
number of female board directors the more likely a company is listed in corporate 
recognition lists such as ‘the Most Admired Companies’, ‘the Most Ethical Companies’ or 
‘the Best Company to Work for’ and the ‘Best Corporate Citizen’. Furthermore, the 
results imply that companies appearing on those lists have on average higher 
percentage of female directors compared to companies that are not presented in any of 
these rankings over the period of seven years covered by the study. Prior single-year 
studies by Bernardi et al. (2006, 2009) and Larkin et al. (2012) also state that for 
Fortune500 companies, a higher number of female board members is correlated with 
the company being listed on corporate recognition lists. Also, the authors Hafsi and 
Turgut (2013) find a positive correlation between demographic diversity in boards, in 
-50-  
 
particular the age and gender of directors and corporate social performance. However, 
this effect is moderated by the structural diversity of boards which comprises processes 
and other board characteristics such as board size, board independence etc. except 
board member demographics. Also, Bear et al. (2010) show evidence for improvements 
in CSR with increasing board gender diversity.  
For Korea, Chang et al. (2015) undertake a research study to analyze the impact of board 
characteristics on firm sustainability performance. They assume that for Korea these 
effects should be differently patterned, in particular non-linear compared to most of the 
results of western countries-oriented studies. The authors find evidence for a 
curvilinear pattern between companies’ CSR performance and board members’ 
educational diversity, board independence and CEO-outside director social ties 
concluding, that the institutional settings play an important role for the linkage between 
CSR and board characteristics. For Europe one of the most important studies is 
undertaken by Isidro and Sobral (2015) who analyzed the direct impacts of gender 
diversity on firm value and the indirect impacts via compliance with ethical and social 
compliance. By using a simultaneous equation model, the results show no correlation 
between greater female representation on board of directors and financial performance. 
However, for the indirect effects, the authors find proof, that board gender diversity has 
a positive increasing effect on the social and ethical compliance that in turn is associated 
with higher corporate financial performance.   
Empirical research on impacts of board gender diversity and in particular, subordinated 
management diversity on environmental sustainability is near non-existent. Especially, 
for the real estate industry, in fact research has proved a strong link between 
environmental sustainability in the sense of low emission, energy and resource 
efficiency and the higher property valuation (e.g. Fuerst and McAllister, 2011; Chegut et 
al., 2012; Fuerst et al., 2013), however, concerning the effects of gender diversity on the 
real estate and construction industry, there is no research to our best knowledge. Hence, 
this work closes the research gap and provides initial research in this field. 
3.3 Research hypotheses 
Sustainability and in particular, environmental sustainability is becoming more and 
more important for the society as a whole. The foremost reason for increased public, 
private as well as regulatory attention is the threatening climate change. As a result, 
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corporations are increasingly forced to take responsibility for their actions. Grossly 
negligent ignorance of such responsibilities can result in severe image damages. 
Furthermore, from the companies’ competitiveness point of view, considering 
sustainable development in the core business can have direct and indirect financial 
performance benefits such as energy efficiency, increasing customer loyalty and trust, 
natural resource independence and prevention of lawsuits and penalty payments 
triggered by environmental scandals. Companies are trying to improve their 
sustainability performance. Gender diversity is identified as a mean to reach this 
objective. However, as explained in the previous section, gender diversity is assumed to 
be a desirable objective from an economic as well as an ethical point of view. However, 
academic research mainly analyzes the financial performance implications of gender 
parity on board of directors’ level. In this context, quotas improving gender parity are 
criticized as tokenism. Firstly, the predominant part of the business world still has one 
female board member. Furthermore, important decision-making positions are all male 
dominated. Hence, there is a double tokenism effect:  
1) The tokenism of having one woman on the board. 
2) The tokenism of having gender parity on board level but no female managers in 
important decision-making positions.  
Taking this into account the aforementioned assumed positive effects of gender 
diversity in management and the lacking literature on this subject concerning 
sustainability, the aim of this research study is to explore and better understand the link 
between gender diverse management and corporate environmental performance. Hence 
the main research hypotheses addressed in this study are the following:  
H1.1: Female managers in decision-relevant positions have a positive influence on the 
overall environmental sustainability performance of a company. 
H1.2: Female managers in decision-relevant positions have a positive influence on the 
environmental resource reduction/product innovation/emission reduction.  
H1.3: The positive environmental impact of female managers is higher for companies with 
at least 10 % female managers.  
H1.4:  Board diversity has a smaller impact on corporate environmental performance.  
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H2.1: Female managers in decision-relevant positions have a higher positive influence on 
the overall environmental sustainability performance of a real estate company. 
H2.2: Female managers in decision-relevant positions have a higher positive influence on 
the environmental resource reduction/product innovation/emission reduction of real 
estate companies.  
In this context it is also analyzed what aspects of environmental sustainability (resource 
reduction, product innovation or emission reduction) are highly influenced by female 
managers. Furthermore, this paper aims to find out whether board level diversity has 
also an effect on environmental performance by using the board level diversity score 
produced by Thomson Reuters Asset4ESG index and if so, whether board diversity has a 
lower positive impact on environmental sustainability compared to female managers. 
The focus will also be on the effect of board level diversity on the environmental 
sustainability sub-scores. Particularly, for the majorly male-dominated real estate and 
construction industry it is examined, whether there are any benefits from female 
management. Moreover, the real estate industry is also analyzed with respect to the 
diversity impacts on the different environmental sustainability sub-scores. 
3.4 Research design 
3.4.1 Sample selection  
The sample of companies analyzed in this study comprise Thomson Reuters’ group of 
companies whose sustainability performance is rated in the Asset4ESG database. The 
initial sample covers a broad, global range of 3,799 companies from different industrial 
sectors, geographical regions and companies with different corporate characteristics 
such as company size. After the elimination of obsolete data and companies not 
operating anymore, a final unbalanced panel data set of 3,403 companies remains over a 
time span of 14 years (2002-2015). For these companies the data on the corporate 
environmental sustainability performance, the board diversity score, the percentage of 
female managers as well as the data on corporate employee diversity is adapted from 
Thomson Reuters Asset4ESG database. Thomson Reuters publishes since 2001 annually 
information on corporate sustainability based on more than 400 individual data points 
on financial, environmental, social and governance performance of companies. These 
individual data points are the basis for the calculation of more than 70 key performance 
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indicators that in turn are summed up to category scores for each of the three 
sustainability pillars: environmental, social and governance. In the case of 
environmental sustainability, the KPI’s sum up to the categories “Product Innovation”, 
“Emission Reduction” and “Resource Reduction” that are also subject of the current 
study. The data is collected manually from all publicly available information sources and 
is controlled and verified in a comprehensive process by analysts. Hence, this data set is 
the most comprehensive data to be available on sustainability and is increasingly 
applied in research that was until now dominated by MSCI KLD sustainability rating 
restricted to the U.S. The remaining data for the control variables such as the financial 
performance measures are retrieved from Datastream. 
3.4.2 Measures and descriptive statistics 
As already discussed, the dependent variable is primarily the environmental pillar score 
(Envscore) derived from the Asset4ESG data set. According to Thomson Reuters, this 
environmental sustainability score measures a company’s impact on the ecosystems and 
all living and non-living resources such as water, air and land. In fact, the score 
represents a company’s ability to make the best use of its management practice to 
prevent environmental hazards and risks as well as the best use of its environmental 
opportunities to generate long-term shareholder value. The variable has only positive 
values and the score varies between 0 (lowest) and 100 (highest), also interpretable as 
percentage numbers. Since this overall condensed environmental sustainability score 
might provide only a one-dimensional view of the environmental sustainability 
performance of a company, the three sub-category scores “Product Innovation” (ENPI), 
“Emission Reduction” (ENER) and “Resource Reduction” (ENRR) are further dependent 
variables that are used to make an in depth analysis of the specific environmental 
performance. ENPI, in particular, measures the company’s efforts to support research 
and development of eco-friendly and -efficient products and/or services. The creation of 
new technologies and processes or the increased durability of products and materials 
can open new market opportunities and by this reduce environmental costs and 
burdens for the company’s customers. ENRR captures the company’s effectiveness and 
the commitment of its management to increase the effectiveness of natural resource 
consumption. That is for example, the reduction of natural resources (e.g. water, energy, 
wood etc.) in the production process or the creation of more eco-efficient solutions by 
-54-  
 
improving supply chain management. ENER measures a company’s ability to reduce 
hazardous environmental emissions such as greenhouse gases, hazardous waste or 
negative impacts on the biodiversity in the corporate production and operational 
processes. Further, it comprises the company’s co-operation with environmental 
organizations to reduce its environmental footprint in the local as well as broader 
community. All three variables have positive values and the scores range between 0 and 
100, also interpretable as percentage numbers. In order to control for any serial 
correlations among the dependent variables, in the sense of dynamic panel data, the first 
lag is used as independent variable - a common approach in research (Isidro and Sobral, 
2015; Harjoto et al., 2015). As independent variable the percentage of female managers 
is used. This variable is a data point and hence not subject to any aggregations. As a 
robustness check the employee diversity is used as a proxy for management diversity. 
The reason for this is that if a company is diversified in management the employment 
diversity might be obvious. The percentage of female employees is also a data point 
variable and not aggregated. The control variables are chosen according to the most 
commonly used control variables in the empirical research literature concerning the 
determinants of corporate sustainability performance. In this context, the majority of 
research focuses on company size, industry, risk and financial performance measures 
(Margolis and Walsh, 2001; Carter et al., 2003; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Boulouta, 
2013; Harjoto et al., 2015). Various corporate financial performance measures are taken 
into consideration to account for different aspects of performance. Market performance 
is calculated as an approximation of Tobin’s Q by taking the sum of the market value of 
equity and the book value of debt, divided by the book value of total assets. In order to 
account for the companies’ accounting performance, return on assets (ROA) is included 
into the equation. While the natural logarithm of total assets is expected to control for 
the size of the company, the risk is approximated by the variable leverage that in turn is 
calculated by the long-term debt to total assets ratio (Miller and Bromiley, 1990; 
Waddock and Graves, 1997; Boulouta, 2013; Orlitzky and Benjamin, 2013; Harjoto et al., 
2015). As a proxy for the operational performance the net sales growth within a year is 
calculated. The level of company diversification is approximated by capital expenditures 
(capex) following Harjato et al. (2015). As already discussed in detail, the majority of 
literature in this field focuses on the effects of board diversity on corporate 
sustainability. In order to isolate the effects of female managers on sustainability, a 
board diversity score is added as a control variable. This Asset4ESG category score 
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assesses a company’s management commitment and effectiveness towards the 
implementation of governance best practice concerning board diversity. Consequently, 
the higher the category score, the higher the company’s ability to ensure critical 
exchange of ideas and independent decision-making process by establishing an 
experienced, diverse and independent board. This variable is expected to control for all 
diversity matters on board level in order to prevent bias resulting out of the omitted 
influence of a diverse board. Further measures controlled for are the ratio of earnings 
before interest and tax (ebit) to sales as a measure for company’s profitability and the 
dividend yield.   
The descriptive statistics for the common sample are illustrated in the subsequent 
exhibit 3.2 followed by the descriptive statistics of various sub-samples in exhibit 3.3. 
Exhibit 3.2| Descriptive statistics of the total sample 
 
 
 
Observations Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
Envscore 20,180 48.77 97.30 0.00 32.55 
ENER 20,180 48.50 98.04 0.00 32.50 
ENPI 20,180 48.18 99.68 0.00 31.34 
ENRR 20,180 48.73 97.21 0.00 32.73 
%Female 
Managers 
20,180 7.76 85.12 0.00 14.33 
Empl. Diversity 20,180 14.31 98.00 0.00 20.56 
Board 
Diversity 
20,180 51.47 99.00 1.31 31.36 
Total Assets 20,180 33,513,267 3,014,500,227 11,479.62 148,764,412 
Sales Growth 20,180 0.11 1.67 -0.83 0.24 
ROA 20,180 0.05 0.97 -0.97 0.10 
Leverage 20,180 0.19 2.67 0.00 0.17 
Capex 20,180 599,186.61 38,378,803.84 49.38 1,740,227.00 
EBIT Sales 
Ratio 
20,180 0.15 0.93 -0.52 0.17 
Tobin’s Q 20,180 0.24 2.68 0.00 0.19 
Dividend Yield 20,180 2.32 61.02 0.00 2.52 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
The sample statistics show that on average, the sample companies have an 
environmental sustainability (Envscore) score of 48.77 %. Also, the average scores for 
ENER, ENPI and ENRR are in the same range. Considering the possible score range is 0 
to 100, the mean indicates a moderate average scoring. The minimum of 0 % and the 
maximum of almost 100 % with a standard deviation of about 32 % indicate quite large 
variation between the companies that in turn is a good prerequisite for the following 
regression analysis. The average company in the sample has total assets of 33,513,267 
Euro, whereby the largest company has total assets of 3,014,500,227 Euro. In this 
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context, it is important to consider, that the total sample also includes financial 
companies whose financial accounting display certain differences compared to other 
sectors. The minimum total asset size of about 11,480 Euro and the standard deviation 
of 148,764,412 Euro show a wide distribution between different company sizes. The 
average company in the sample has 7.76 % female managers and a total of 14.31 % 
female employees. The numbers indicate enough variations with a maximum of 85.12 % 
female managers and a maximum of 98 % female employees. Both variables have a 
minimum of 0 % and a standard deviation of 14.33 % and 20.56 %, respectively. Also the 
board gender diversity score varies between the minimum of 1.31 % and the maximum 
of 99 % with a mean of 51.47 %.  
The descriptive statistics of the sub-samples (real estate, industry, utilities, financial and 
insurance) are showed in the following exhibit 3.3. 
Exhibit 3.3| Descriptive statistics of sub-samples 
 
Exhibit 3.3.1: Real estate sub-sample 
 
Observations Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
Envscore 1,843 42.09 97.18 8.61 30.79 
ENER 1,843 38.83 97.68 7.42 30.49 
ENPI 1,843 47.57 99.68 12.62 30.35 
ENRR 1,843 41.21 96.22 7.53 31.32 
%Female 
Managers 
1,843 6.48 73.00 0.00 13.70 
Empl. Diversity 1,843 13.06 84.00 0.00 20.21 
Board 
Diversity 
1,843 52.67 94.46 1.31 31.54 
Total Assets 1,843 8,526,198 196,484,780 91,781 14,152,605 
Sales Growth 1,843 0.23 190.88 -3.51 4.51 
ROA 1,843 0.03 0.53 -0.85 0.07 
Leverage 1,843 0.29 1.04 0.00 0.19 
Capex 1,843 260,648.42 18,276,215.00 0.00 576,118.84 
EBIT Sales 
Ratio 
1,843 0.39 14.50 -6.47 0.82 
Tobin’s Q 1,843 0.36 1.05 0.00 0.20 
Dividend Yield 1,843 3.38 41.54 0.00 3.43 
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Exhibit 3.3.2: Industry sub-sample 
 
Observations Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
Envscore 6,988 54.19 97.21 0.00 31.65 
ENER 6,988 54.56 98.04 0.00 31.49 
ENPI 6,988 53.24 99.68 0.00 32.21 
ENRR 6,988 52.37 97.01 0.00 31.41 
%Female 
Managers 
6,988 5.18 85.12 0.00 9.65 
Empl. Diversity 6,988 9.84 85.12 0.00 13.46 
Board 
Diversity 
6,988 51.08 95.82 1.31 31.17 
Total Assets 6,988 11,206,870 581,081,166 11,480 29,139,873 
Sales Growth 6,988 0.48 1,079.30 -1.00 14.44 
ROA 6,988 0.04 2.27 -4.72 0.14 
Leverage 6,988 0.18 1.49 0.00 0.14 
Capex 6,988 731,627.52 38,378,803.84 0.00 2,327,363.42 
EBIT Sales 
Ratio 
6,988 -1.29 173.34 -2,523.25 38.83 
Tobin's Q 6,988 0.24 1.96 0.00 0.16 
Dividend Yield 6,988 2.07 43.96 0.00 2.32 
Exhibit 3.3.3: Utilities sub-sample 
 
Observations Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
Envscore 6,952 48.15 97.3 0.00 32.33 
ENER 6,952 48.83 97.81 7.29 32.67 
ENPI 6,952 45.19 99.68 9.05 30.30 
ENRR 6,952 49.53 97.21 7.44 32.84 
%Female 
Managers 
6,952 9.42 83.00 0.00 16.50 
Empl. Diversity 6,952 16.28 98.00 0.00 22.81 
Board 
Diversity 
6,952 51.06 99.00 1.59 31.62 
Total Assets 6,952 10,612,667 354,123,778 18,031 23,114,125 
Sales Growth 6,952 0.77 3,701.47 -2.27 44.92 
ROA 6,952 0.06 3.36 -2.08 0.12 
Leverage 6,952 0.20 2.67 0.00 0.19 
Capex 6,952 520,574.56 30,761,000.00 0.00 1,402,701.79 
EBIT Sales 
Ratio 
6,952 -0.49 6.64 -2,156.83 29.29 
Tobin's Q 6,952 0.26 2.68 0.00 0.20 
Dividend Yield 6,952 2.20 61.02 0.00 2.39 
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Exhibit 3.3.4: Financial and insurance sub-sample 
 
Observations Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
Envscore 2,991 40.36 96.97 8.30 32.52 
ENER 2,991 39.50 97.58 7.25 31.55 
ENPI 2,991 41.72 99.67 13.66 29.66 
ENRR 2,991 41.01 97.18 7.33 33.69 
%Female 
Managers 
2,991 11.08 79.87 0.00 17.70 
Empl. 
Diversity 
2,991 21.20 92.00 0.00 26.45 
Board 
Diversity 
2,991 51.51 96.26 1.94 30.51 
Total Assets 2,991 163,405,920 3,014,500,227 21,014 354,607,848 
Sales Growth 2,991 23.97 61,691.00 -2.23 1,134.80 
ROA 2,991 0.02 1.15 -0.49 0.06 
Leverage 2,991 0.10 0.94 0.00 0.13 
Capex 2,991 330,259.59 18,453,795.00 0.00 1,070,639.62 
EBIT Sales 
Ratio 
2,991 -5.87 472.00 -16,628.61 306.96 
Tobin's Q 2,991 0.17 0.95 0.00 0.17 
Dividend Yield 2,991 2.67 57.94 0.00 2.41 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
The comparison of different sub-samples provides interesting insights into the data set: 
The financial and insurance companies have the least environmental sustainability 
scores (Envscore: 40.36 %; ENER: 39.5 %; ENPI: 41.72 %; ENRR: 41.01 %) which do not 
really surprise due to their service-oriented, non-producing business sector. The real 
estate and construction industry’s sustainability performance is on average very close to 
that of financial and insurance companies. However, taking into account, that this sector 
has the highest exposure due to its business activities as one of the main contributors to 
climate change and resource exploitation (see previous chapter), the results indicate 
that the real estate and construction industry needs environmental sustainability 
improvements. Furthermore, apart from industry companies, real estate and 
construction companies have the lowest number of female managers: As such, an 
average company of the sector has 6.48 % female managers, while the average company 
of the financial and insurance sector employs 11.08 % female managers, marking the 
highest number. Also, the employment diversity is by far the highest in the finance and 
insurance sector (22.2%), while real estate and construction industry has on average 
13.06 % female employees – the second lowest numbers after the industry sub-sample 
with a corporate gender diversity of 9.84 %. These numbers confirm first of all that the 
variable corporate gender diversity can be an approximation for the management 
diversity, since the values of the variables female managers and employment diversity 
follow the same pattern.  
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All sub-samples have a minimum number of female managers of zero. This indicates that 
gender diversity on management level is still an issue across all sub-samples. It is also 
noticeable, that the average board diversity score of all sub-samples is in the range of 
51.06 % (utilities) to 52.67 % (real estate). This indicates a high discrepancy to the low 
number of female managers supporting the fundamental assumption of this work that 
board level diversity aspirations might be subject to tokenism if the diversity is not 
promoted on decision-making management levels. Furthermore, the narrow 
distribution of the average board diversity scores also suggest that meanwhile the 
legislative activities concerning board gender diversity have reached the companies in 
all sectors, resulting in greater attempts to set the framework conditions for diversity on 
board level. 
However, the large variations in the sustainability scores and the number of female 
managers across different industries suggest the need to control for industrial effects. 
Hence, the reported results in the following regression analysis are based on industry 
fixed effects.  
The pairwise correlation coefficients indicate high correlations for the environmental 
sustainability performance with the subcategories ENER, ENPI and ENRR. This is not 
surprising, since these three categories sum up to Envscore. The correlations of interest 
are the coefficients of board diversity, percentage of female managers and employment 
diversity with Envscore. As expected, the percentage of female managers and 
employment diversity exhibit positive values around 0.41 and 0.45 – which are within 
the scope of acceptable correlations (Evans, 1996). Also, the correlations of female 
managers with environmental sustainability subcategories are in the same range and 
thus acceptable. Female managers and employment diversity have a quite high 
correlation of about 0.76, however, these variables are not used in the same equation. 
The same applies for Envscore and ENER, ENPI and ENRR. Board diversity and the 
percentage of female managers have correlation of about 0.05 which indicates that the 
common interface of these two variables is quite low and hence potential bias from 
multicollinearity can be excluded. As suggested by empirical literature, though weak, 
there are positive correlations between board diversity and environmental (sub-)scores. 
The following exhibit 3.4 summarizes the correlation coefficients.  
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Exhibit 3.4| Key variables pairwise correlation coefficients 
 
 
  
Envscore  ENER ENPI ENRR 
Board 
Diversity 
Empl. 
Diversity 
%Female 
Managers 
Envscore 1             
ENER 0.9326 1           
ENPI 0.8362 0.6600 1         
ENRR 0.9336 0.8642 0.6563 1       
Board Diversity 0.0970 0.0943 0.1201 0.0557 1     
Empl_ Diversity 0.4489 0.4440 0.2733 0.4906 0.0007 1   
%Female Managers 0.4074 0.4115 0.2474 0.4429 0.0536 0.7590 1 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
3.5 Empirical results 
The empirical analysis examines the impact of the percentage of female managers in a 
company on the environmental performance using multivariate regression analysis and 
controlling for external factors that other empirical studies have identified as 
determinants of Corporate Social Responsibility (Harjoto and Jo, 2011; Baron et al., 
2011; Harjoto et al., 2015).  
For the panel regression, in a first step, it was determined whether a fixed effects or 
random effects model would be more appropriate. For this, the crucial assumption is 
that the random effects are not correlated with the explanatory variables. The Hausman 
test resulted in a p-value of 0.000 meaning that the hypothesis of correlated random 
effects and thus the random effects model can be abandoned (results are not tabulated 
here). As expected, the firm-fixed effects model is the more suitable model controlling 
for time-invariant firm and country characteristics. Since multicollinearity is a quite 
large problem in panel data regression, the Durbin Watson test is performed and the 
results of less than 1 show serial correlation in the residuals. To overcome this problem, 
the first lag of the dependent variable is implemented according to a dynamic panel data 
model in the equation. In order to control for heteroscedasticity, the white cross section 
coefficient covariance method is chosen. The results of the panel regression analysis are 
summarized in the following exhibit 3.5. 
Exhibit 3.5| Regression results for Envscore, ENER, ENPI and ENRR as dependent 
variables 
 
 
Envscore ENER ENPI ENRR 
% Female Managers 
0.0645** 
(2.2443) 
0.0680** 
(1.9743) 
0.1782*** 
(4.4746) 
0.0170 
(0.4722) 
Board Diversity 
0.0538*** 
(7.3432) 
0.0544*** 
(6.6945) 
0.0483*** 
(5.3363) 
0.0572*** 
(6.8212) 
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Total Assets 
5.0830*** 
(15.7185) 
5.0684*** 
(14.2070) 
4.0007*** 
(9.8705) 
5.9289*** 
(16.0180) 
Sales Growth 
0.0010*** 
(3.4149) 
0.0011*** 
(2.6763) 
0.0019*** 
(5.4751) 
0.0010*** 
(3.5866) 
ROA 
-1.8081** 
(2.5070) 
-0.9577 
(1.2558) 
-2.4113*** 
(2.6943) 
-1.9011** 
(2.2621) 
Leverage 
0.7460 
(0.4924) 
0.6524 
(0.3808) 
2.3020 
(1.1978) 
0.4827 
(0.2687) 
Capex 
-0.1689 
(1.1670) 
-0.4343*** 
(0.0084) 
0.1890 
(1.0596) 
-0.2129 
(1.2683) 
Ebit Sales Ratio 
-0.0007 
(0.3105) 
-0.0010 
(0.5140) 
-0.0021 
(1.2860) 
0.0010 
(3.5866)*** 
Lag Envscore 
0.5072*** 
(46.5004)    
Lag ENER Score 
 
0.4630*** 
(42.4900)   
Lag ENPI Score 
  
0.4425*** 
(41.0090)  
Lag ENRR Score 
   
0.4644*** 
(43.4798) 
Tobin's Q 
0.8309 
(0.5927) 
1.0173 
(0.6573) 
-2.4145 
(1.3503) 
1.2806 
(0.7525) 
Dividend Yield 
0.0078 
(0.1994) 
0.0197 
(0.3739) 
0.0205 
(0.4064) 
0.0139 
(0.3101) 
     
Constant 
-61.8955*** 
(12.4222) 
-56.2228*** 
(10.1699) 
-46.1552*** 
(7.2596) 
-73.4277*** 
(12.8282) 
R²-adjusted 0.9028 0.8824 0.8289 0.8695 
Durbin Watson Stat 2.2635 2.2168 2.2554 2.2763 
No. of cross sections 3528 3528 3528 3528 
No. Observations 20808 20808 20808 20808 
Full sample Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Significance of coefficients: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; t-values in parenthesis.  
Source: Own illustration. 
 
The results show a positive, though weak, influence of female managers on the 
environmental sustainability performance of the company. That is a 10 % increase in 
female manager results in a 0.6450 % higher total environmental sustainability score at 
a 5 % significance level, ceteris paribus.  As suggested by previous literature, the results 
prove the positive impact of diverse boards on the environmental sustainability 
performance of a company. These results also confirm the assumption that the 
management level gender diversity has a larger influence on the sustainability 
performance of a company compared to the board level diversity. The influence of the 
company size on the environmental performance is of about the same magnitude: A 10 
% increase in total assets results in a 0.5083 % increase in environmental performance 
score at a 1 % significance level, ceteris paribus. One possible explanation for the 
positive effects could be that large corporations have the necessary funds to invest in 
environmental sustainability. The largest impact is exercised by return on assets (ROA). 
A one unit increase in ROA results in a 1.8081 % decrease of the environmental 
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sustainability score, ceteris paribus. The coefficient is significant at the 5 % level. A 
plausible explanation could be that the higher the ROA, the higher the corporate 
effectiveness in generating net income from the monetary resources it has for 
investment purpose. However, sustainable environmental earnings are mostly 
contradictory to high profits in the short term. Hence, increasing the effectiveness of 
investment abilities – that is the return on assets on an annual basis – is at the cost of 
environmental sustainability in the short term. Concerning CAPEX as a measure of 
corporate diversity, the negative impact could indicate that the operational expansion of 
a company, the investment in new projects to increase the scope of the company’s 
operations is in the first place also requiring resources that cannot be invested in 
environmental sustainability. Hence, the more diverse a company is set up, the fewer 
resources are available to focus on the highest and best environmental standards in 
every field. Leverage as a measure of risk can have a positive impact on the corporate 
environmental sustainability. Since, with increasing risk corporations might try to 
compensate with risk reducing factors such as sustainability (Lee and Faff, 2009; Mishra 
and Modi, 2013). Though in this case, the coefficient is not significant at the common 
significant levels.  
The impact on the environmental sustainability sub-categories is of a similar magnitude 
for the emission reduction category – the ENER score. It is weaker for the environmental 
resource reduction category (ENRR) and stronger for the environmental product 
innovation (ENPI) sub-category compared to the Envscore. For ENPI, a 10 % increase in 
female manager results in a 1.782 % increase in environmental product innovation 
sustainability score, holding other effects fixed. Thus, it can be assumed that female 
managers predominantly promote the development of eco-efficient products and 
services and thereby increase the sustainable product innovation abilities of a company. 
The goodness of fit of the regression models is very good with range above 0.80.  
3.5.1 Empirical results for companies with at least 10 percent female managers 
When extracting the sample of companies with at least 10 % female managers, the 
regression results of the fixed effect panel model show the following pattern, as 
presented in exhibit 3.6: 
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Exhibit 3.6| Regression results of the Envscore, ENER, ENPI and ENRR for the sub-
sample of at least 10 % female managers 
 
 
Envscore ENER ENPI ENRR 
% Female Managers 
0.1660*** 
(6.8065) 
0.1698*** 
(5.7584) 
0.2619*** 
(6.7341) 
0.1210*** 
(4.1529) 
Board Diversity 
0.0356*** 
(3.8004) 
0.0387*** 
(3.4174) 
0.0328** 
(2.1942) 
0.0376*** 
(3.3573) 
Total Assets 
2.5980*** 
(4.7041) 
2.5504*** 
(3.8215) 
3.0781*** 
(3.5219) 
3.5198*** 
(5.3433) 
Sales Growth 
0.0035 
(0.1356) 
0.0033 
(0.1078) 
0.0006 
(0.0143) 
-0.0001 
(0.0037) 
ROA 
1.4422 
(0.7257) 
1.0310 
(0.4293) 
-0.8452 
(0.2664) 
0.9410 
(0.3959) 
Leverage 
0.7828 
(0.2198) 
-1.4738 
(0.3424) 
3.5186 
(0.6186) 
2.2020 
(0.5170) 
Capex 
-0.6886*** 
(2.6662) 
-0.9771*** 
(3.1311) 
0.0041 
(0.0099) 
-0.6794 
(2.2011) 
Ebit Sales Ratio 
-0.0021 
(0.1548) 
-0.0009 
(0.0542) 
-0.0024 
(0.1100) 
-0.0021 
(0.1243) 
Lag Envscore 
0.3325*** 
(31.3625) 
   
Lag ENER Score 
 
0.3063*** 
(26.5832) 
  
Lag ENPI Score 
 
 0.3171*** 
(26.6558) 
 
Lag ENRR Score 
 
  0.2635*** 
(23.1620) 
Tobin's Q 
-5.9241* 
(1.6771) 
-4.1447 
(0.9708) 
-9.0023 
(1.596) 
-8.3566** 
(1.9785) 
Dividend Yield 
0.1097 
(1.5077) 
0.1141 
(1.2978) 
0.1637 
(1.4096) 
0.0714 
(0.8213) 
 
    
Constant 
12.6428 
(1.5829) 
18.7608* 
(1.9415) 
-11.2578 
(0.8844) 
4.6163 
(0.4834) 
R²-adjusted 0.8827 0.8311 0.8139 0.8154 
Durbin Watson Stat 2.1602 2.1565 2.2916 2.184 
No. of cross sections 1379 1379 1379 1379 
No. Observations 6001 6001 6001 6001 
Full sample No No No No 
Significance of coefficients: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; t-values in parenthesis. 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
The results show even higher sustainability impacts of female managers. As such, a 10 % 
increase in the number of female manager results in a 1.66 % increase in the Envscore. 
Also, the highest impact can be identified for the ENPI score. A 10 % increase in the 
number of female managers results in a 2.62 % increase in a company’s environmental 
product innovation abilities. Hence, companies can generate even 1.5 times higher 
positive impacts of diversity when they employ at least 10 % female managers.  
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3.5.2 Real estate industry specific results 
In order to analyze the impact of gender diversity in management positions on the real 
estate and construction industry’s environmental sustainability performance, the 
sample is reduced to the real estate and construction industry resulting in 301 
companies and 1.833 observations. The results of the fixed effects panel regression with 
white cross section coefficient covariance method are displayed in the following exhibit 
3.7.  
Exhibit 3.7| Regression results of the Envscore, ENER, ENPI and ENRR for the real 
estate and construction sub-sample  
 
  Envscore ENER ENPI ENRR 
%Female Managers 
0.1442* 
(1.7902) 
0.1638** 
(2.0064) 
0.1480 
(1.2960) 
0.0930 
(0.9806) 
Board Diversity 
0.0764*** 
(5.1680) 
0.0725*** 
(2.9986) 
0.0563** 
(2.3173) 
0.0659*** 
(4.3005) 
Total Assets 
5.8076*** 
(5.7488) 
6.1295*** 
(6.2289) 
4.3997*** 
(4.4951) 
6.7048*** 
(6.2503) 
Sales Growth 
-0.0848 
(0.2398) 
-0.1990 
(0.4649) 
-0.0298 
(0.0909) 
-0.5402 
(1.3908) 
ROA 
-14.2909** 
(2.2340) 
-16.0976*** 
(3.4570) 
-14.1310* 
(1.7584) 
-6.2219 
(1.0417) 
Leverage 
2.5345 
(0.4460) 
-11.2237 
(1.5152) 
13.0454* 
(1.7892) 
-3.1769 
(0.3171) 
Capex 
-19.2x109 
(0.4624) 
-1.0757*** 
(3.4075) 
-11.9x109 *** 
(4.3607) 
-83.8x109* 
(1.7939) 
Ebit Sales Ratio 
0.3474 
(0.5328) 
0.8808* 
(1.9069) 
-0.4491 
(0.3180) 
-0.3045 
(0.5440) 
Lag Envscore  
0.5126*** 
(8.8840)  
    
Lag ENER Score   
0.4331*** 
(20.3470) 
    
Lag ENPI Score    
 
0.4594** 
(7.9426) 
  
Lag ENRR Score   
 
  
0.4531*** 
(8.7723) 
Tobin's Q 
5.1492 
(0.7206) 
16.715** 
(2.2736) 
-8.0031 
(1.0412) 
11.0637 
(1.0647) 
Dividend Yield 
-0.1124** 
(2.0164) 
-0.0961 
(0.9114) 
-0.1884** 
(2.0797) 
-0.0214 
(0.2665) 
    
 
    
Constant 
-75.8705 
(5.4181) 
-65.2522*** 
(4.6253) 
-45.2612*** 
(3.4137) 
-88.9749*** 
(5.2577) 
R²-adjusted 0.9008 0.8693 0.8110 0.8585 
Durbin Watson Stat 2.1352 2.1317 2.2279 2.2783 
No. of cross sections 301 318 301 301 
No. Observations 1833 1882 1833 1833 
Full sample No No No No 
Significance of coefficients: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; t-values in parenthesis. 
Source: Own illustration. 
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The regression results of the fixed effects panel analysis show that for the real estate and 
construction industry, female managers have an even greater positive impact compared 
to the total sample. A 10 % increase in female manager results in a 1.44 % increase in 
the overall environmental sustainability score. Also, the impact on the ENER sub-
category is significantly higher, with a 10 % increase in female manager leading to a 1.64 
% increase in emission reduction pillar score, ceteris paribus. This high impact of female 
managers on environmental emission reduction score provides proof that the real estate 
and construction industry could benefit the most – especially, in the field where the 
sector has the highest negative environmental impacts: the emission of CO2 and other 
hazardous substances. Also, in the real estate industry, board diversity plays a 
significant role in determining the environmental sustainability performance.  
3.6 Robustness tests 
Several robustness tests are conducted to examine whether the initial results of the 
main regression analysis hold under different conditions. First of all, the proportion of 
female employees over a period of ten years is used as an approximation for the 
management diversity in order to test, whether the results hold using a different 
measure. The results are tabulated in exhibit 3.8.  
Exhibit 3.8| Regression results with employee diversity as approximation for 
management diversity and impact on Envscore, ENER, ENPI and ENRR  
  Envscore ENER ENPI ENRR 
%  Female Employees 
0.0549** 
(2.4530) 
0.0150 
(0.3137) 
0.0962* 
(1.7718) 
0.0414 
(1.2848) 
Board Diversity 
0.0393*** 
(2.7584) 
0.0351*** 
(4.8744) 
0.0378*** 
(4.5944) 
0.0432*** 
(3.8582) 
Total Assets 
3.8303*** 
(6.2834) 
4.0180*** 
(12.2349) 
4.0869*** 
(10.4223) 
4.5377*** 
(7.2311) 
Sales Growth 
0.0064 
(1.6090) 
0.0011*** 
(3.2012) 
0.0020*** 
(6.0851) 
0.0010*** 
(4.6868) 
ROA 
-1.4339 
(1.6392) 
-0.3875 
(0.5213) 
-3.2932*** 
(3.1649) 
-1.1073 
(0.9644) 
Leverage 
-0.8854 
(0.5060) 
-1.6354 
(0.9567) 
2.2001 
(1.1284) 
-0.0229 
(0.0200) 
Capex 
-0.2014 
(1.0759) 
-0.2366 
(1.5794) 
-0.0455 
(0.2753) 
-0.1859 
(1.1499) 
Ebit  Sales Ratio 
-0.0022** 
(2.0050) 
-0.0031** 
(2.044) 
-0.0003 
(0.3953) 
-0.0014 
(0.7409) 
Lag Envscore 
0.4360*** 
(6.5088) 
      
Lag ENER Score    
0.4077*** 
(39.1222) 
    
Lag ENPI Score      
0.4041*** 
(39.1896) 
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Lag ENRR Score        
0.4256*** 
(8.7859) 
Tobin's Q 
1.2947 
(0.8096) 
1.5845 
(0.9879) 
-1.9267 
(1.0059) 
1.3734 
(0.9491) 
Dividend Yield 
0.0145 
(0.1937) 
0.0119  
(0.3106) 
0.0403 
(0.9258) 
0.0166 
(0.3068) 
          
Constant   
-35.9736 
(6.9199) 
-41.8945 
(6.5294) 
-47.3253 
(4.4880) 
R²-adjusted 0.9228 0.8994 0.8431 0.8881 
Durbin Watson Stat 2.2442 2.1422 2.2101 2.1865 
Full sample Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Period 2005-2015 2005-2015 2005-2016 2005-2017 
No. of cross sections 3525 3525 3525 3525 
No. Observations 19675 19675 19675 19675 
Full sample Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Significance of coefficients: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; t-values in parenthesis. 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
The results of the robustness check indicate a positive impact. The coefficients of the 
overall environmental sustainability score and the sub-category ENPI are significant at 
the 5 %, respectively 10 % significance level. However, the magnitude of the coefficients 
of ENER and ENRR is close to the main regression analysis, though the coefficients are 
not significant. A possible explanation for the lacking significance could be that in the 
presence of employment diversity, the effects formerly reflected by female management 
is now caught up by board gender diversity. Board diversity exerts a highly significant 
influence.  
As a second step, a sensitivity analysis is undertaken by examining different sub-
samples. Due to different accounting frameworks, the financial companies of the total 
sample could add some distorting effects in the initial regression analysis. In this 
context, the potential effects of the financial industry are canceled out by reducing the 
sample to non-financial companies (exhibit 3.9).  
Exhibit 3.9| Regression results for the non-financial sub-sample 
  Envscore ENER ENPI ENRR 
% Female Managers 
0.0931*** 
(2.6727) 
0.0930*** 
(3.4303) 
0.1916*** 
(3.5057) 
0.0573 
(1.0376) 
CGBS Score 
0.0578*** 
(5.0666) 
0.0501*** 
(4.5991) 
0.0605*** 
(5.4520) 
0.0615*** 
(4.9182) 
Total Assets 
5.2542*** 
(9.1713) 
5.0793*** 
(9.9384) 
4.0136*** 
(8.7397) 
6.2737*** 
(9.2507) 
Sales Growth 
0.0015*** 
(4.3845) 
0.0018*** 
(5.6785) 
0.0025*** 
(5.3994) 
0.0015*** 
(2.9537) 
ROA 
-1.5770* 
(1.7012) 
-0.7576 
(1.1142) 
-2.2418* 
(1.7105) 
-1.6920** 
(1.9726) 
Leverage 
1.0452 
(0.6581) 
0.5708 
(0.2680) 
2.4425 
(1.5555) 
0.9882 
(0.6529) 
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Capex 
-0.1463 
(0.7851) 
-0.2389 
(1.3314) 
0.1622 
(0.6863) 
-0.3272* 
(1.8061) 
Ebit  Sales Ratio 
-0.0014 
(0.5203) 
-0.0020 
(1.1210) 
-0.0024 
(-1.0194) 
-0.0001 
(0.0178) 
Lag Envscore  
0.5136*** 
(11.4949) 
      
Lag ENER Score   
0.4764*** 
(13.8882) 
    
Lag ENPI Score     
0.4470*** 
(8.4721) 
  
Lag ENRR Score       
0.4634*** 
(10.2656) 
Tobin's Q 
0.5777 
(0.4827) 
0.9076 
(0.6466) 
-2.5110 
(1.3344) 
1.2555 
(0.9000) 
Dividend Yield 
0.0843 
(1.4219) 
0.0953** 
(2.2392) 
0.0814 
(0.9508) 
0.0783 
(1.4023) 
          
Constant 
-63.3577*** 
(7.1367) 
-56.8364*** 
(6.5674) 
-45.0688*** 
(6.8154) 
-75.5299*** 
(6.8041) 
R²-adjusted 0.8996 0.8792 0.8304 0.8632 
Durbin Watson Stat 2.2906 2.2442 2.2694 2.2935 
No. Of Cross sections 2824 2824 2824 2824 
No. Observations 16,739 16,739 16,739 16,739 
Full sample No No No No 
Significance of coefficients: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; t-values in parenthesis. 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
The regression results of the fixed effects panel model as presented in exhibit 3.9 show 
that the initial results hold using the sub-sample of non-financial companies. Moreover, 
these sub-sample results are highly significant at the strictest significance level of 1 % 
and exert the highest influence - except for ENRR. As such, a 10 % increase in the 
number of female managers results in a 0.931 % increase in the total environmental 
sustainability score, holding all other factors constant. While the magnitude of the 
coefficients of ENER and ENRR are quite similar to the initial results, ENPI seems to have 
the strongest influence in the industrial sub-sample. A 10 % increase in female 
managers results in a 1.916 % increase in the sustainable product innovation sub-
category. Hence, female managers are exerting influence on the long-term sustainability 
performance of the company by predominantly promoting the sustainable technical and 
innovative product development.  
When it comes to sustainability, regional differences e.g. advanced vs. less developed 
countries or sustainability-specific legislation play an important role. Hence, despite a 
fixed effects model, as a next step, regional differences are cancelled out by analyzing a 
sub-sample of European countries. The results are presented in exhibit 3.10.  
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Exhibit 3.10| Regression results for the EU sub-sample   
 
  Envscore ENER ENPI ENRR 
%  Female Managers 
0.1236*** 
(3.4219) 
0.1262*** 
(3.4976) 
0.2347*** 
(4.4867) 
0.0877* 
(1.7876) 
CGBS Score 
0.0206*** 
(2.6060) 
0.03111*** 
(2.7447) 
0.0164 
(0.8361) 
0.0303** 
(2.5079) 
Total Assets 
4.8068*** 
(5.3594) 
5.6450*** 
(5.9902) 
5.2233*** 
(6.7997) 
4.3229*** 
(3.9774) 
Sales Growth 
0.0009*** 
(6.2182) 
0.0008*** 
(4.7490) 
0.0018*** 
(11.1751) 
0.0009*** 
(6.4915) 
ROA 
-3.6701 
(1.5048) 
-5.2211*** 
(2.7606) 
0.9798 
(0.3059) 
-5.3169 
(1.6425) 
Leverage 
0.7261 
(0.1785) 
-0.4564 
(0.1025) 
3.7678 
(0.9360) 
-1.6588 
(0.4050) 
Capex 
-0.5927 
(1.5276) 
-1.0626** 
(2.1936) 
-0.6141* 
(1.6526) 
-0.2636 
(0.6843) 
Ebit Sales Ratio 
0.0066 
(0.5964) 
0.0170* 
(1.6655) 
-0.0233 
(1.4945) 
0.0240 
(1.3036) 
Lag Envscore  
0.4451*** 
(9.9891) 
      
Lag ENER Score   
0.4204*** 
(10.8254) 
    
Lag ENPI Score      
0.400744*** 
(7.969975) 
  
Lag ENRR Score       
0.3653*** 
(8.3772) 
Tobin's Q 
-4.8350 
(1.6407) 
-5.8478** 
(2.1083) 
-6.5526 
(1.6019) 
-3.1955 
(1.1918) 
Dividend Yield 
0.0383 
(1.0241) 
-0.0130 
(0.4813) 
0.0944 
(1.2049) 
0.0515 
(1.3182) 
          
Constant 
-34.3473*** 
(3.5508) 
-40.4231*** 
(3.9269) 
-44.0791 
(4.3927) 
-24.8847* 
(1.8782) 
R²-adjusted 0.8889 0.8475 0.8087 0.8467 
Durbin Watson Stat 2.1644 2.1587 2.2054 2.1327 
No. of cross sections 842 842 842 842 
No. Observations 5132 5132 5132 5132 
Full sample No No No No 
Significance of coefficients: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; t-values in parenthesis. 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
Also, the results of this analysis confirm the initial regression outcomes and indicate a 
even stronger impact of female managers on the environmental sustainability 
performance for developed countries (Europe). A 10 % increase in female employees on 
management level results in a 1.24 % increase in the overall environmental 
sustainability score and in a 1.26 % increase in the ENER sub-category score, holding 
other factors constant. Also here, the environmental product innovation sub-category 
seems to be highly influenced by female managers. A 10 % increase in female managers 
leads to a 2.38 % increase in the ENPI score, ceteris paribus.   
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3.7 Conclusion and discussion 
Board gender diversity has been a heated debate in the public and corporate business 
world for a long time. Triggered by mainly two claims: Firstly, women on board of 
directors improve the effectiveness and hence the financial performance. Secondly, 
having female board members is the right thing to do from an equality-oriented 
perspective. The debate peaked in the increasing implementation of legislative 
regulations determining a gender quota on board level. Empirical research argued not 
only for women on boards due to positive financial performance implications but also 
concerning the increasingly importance gaining topic of sustainability, which diverse 
boards are expected to promote. In this context, environmental sustainability is one of 
the most important sustainability factors since non-sustainable and exploitive behavior 
affect people far beyond the corporate borders. Polluted air, resource scarcity or climate 
change not only affects the going-concern of corporations but also the livelihood of all 
human beings and animal life. The cost of misbehavior can severely damage the 
company’s image and threat its existence when investors, public and legal entities turn 
away or make them accountable for their actions as it happened in the case of 
Volkswagen AG. Furthermore, increased environmental sustainability in terms of 
greater Corporate Social Responsibility leads to long-term competitiveness, customer 
loyalty and investor trust. Therefore, companies not only secure their long-term 
competitiveness but also gain and maintain public trust and support when investing in 
sustainability and acting in a sustainable way.  
However, there is still no definitive empirical evidence for the positive effects of gender 
diversity on sustainability – especially, because the tokenism effect of gender quota is 
assumed to bias the results. Hence, this work extends the board gender debate to three 
new dimensions by focusing on the environmental sustainability as one of the most 
important sustainability dimensions, by putting emphasize on the real estate and 
construction industry as one of the main triggers of climate change and by analyzing the 
role of gender diverse management in order to circumvent the commonly known 
problem of tokenism. The basic assumption is that having a woman on the board is 
tokenism on the top management level. But having gender parity on board level and no 
women on subordinated management level will still preserve tokenism. This double 
tokenism effect will persist as long as gender parity becomes common in decision-
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making management levels. Hence, this work’s focus is innovative and to our best 
knowledge the first research to close the gap and provide initial results in this field.  
The results of the empirical analysis provide evidence that gender diversity on 
management level has a positive impact on the environmental sustainability 
performance of a company. For the total sample the regression results show that a 10 % 
increase in female managers results in a 0.645 % higher environmental rating score, 
ceteris paribus. In particular, the foremost impact is exerted on the environmental 
product innovation score. In this context, a 10 % increase in female manager results in 
1.782 % higher environmental product innovation score. That is, gender diversity on 
management level promotes a company’s sustainability innovativeness and highly 
innovative companies in turn secure their long-term competitiveness and future-
proofness. An isolated analysis of companies with at least 10 % female manager reveals 
an almost 1.5 times higher effect on the environmental product innovativeness 
compared to the total sample. Hence, increased effects can be generated with at least 10 
% female managers.   
Compared to the total sample, for the real estate and construction industry, 
management diversity exerts even stronger positive impacts on the environmental 
emission reduction score. The real estate industry as one of the main contributors of 
climate change would fulfill its sustainability responsibilities by increasing the number 
of women on decision-making level. Emission reduction in turn secures the long-term 
competitiveness and generates higher shareholder value. The results further confirm the 
positive impact of board gender diversity on the environmental sustainability 
performance of a company.  
Hence, the results show that supporting gender diversity on management levels is not 
only the right thing to do from an ethical but also from an environmental and economic 
point of view.  Analyzing the real estate industry as a sector with the highest impact on 
the environment and ecosystems, the results confirm that this industry too can fulfill its 
responsibility by supporting gender diversity on the management level. Thus, diversity 
works best for the company, if it is implemented on the board as well as on subordinated 
management levels. In fact, the sole implementation of gender quotas on board level 
rather drives “tokenism” instead of increasing management quality and hence misses 
the target. Consequently, the highest impact is initiated by management levels besides 
board of directors. Hence, the active management by women plays a more important 
role than the rather passive controlling and advising activities on board level which is 
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also assumed to be biased by tokenism. However, these positive effects also depend on 
the proper and serious implementation of CSR in the core business of the corporation. 
The ideal implementation of CSR goes far beyond altruism; it rather has indirect 
financial performance implications by providing the sustainable long-term success and 
competitiveness of the company. ‘Greenwashing’ aspirations will fail to deliver the 
desired results. Therefore, the composition of senior management teams plays a crucial 
role in achieving effective group work.  
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4 Determinants of board of directors and corporate performance with special 
evidence for real estate companies 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Compared to other sustainability related topics, corporate governance – the principles of 
responsible corporate management and control – and the optimal implementation 
thereof has for a long time been acknowledged as an important aspect of management in 
national and international research as well as in public and legislative debates. Over the 
past decades, the debates reached a climax in the late 90ies when the accounting 
scandals at Enron and WorldCom shed a less favorable light on the corporate 
governance regulation in the U.S. As a result, the Sarban Oxley Act was initiated in 2002. 
However, only a few years later, the financial crisis in 2007/2008 proved that there are 
still serious shortcomings in the corporate governance quality with devastating financial 
and social consequences for major economies around the world. Nowadays, the case of 
Volkswagen AG keeps the debate on good governance and shareholder protection more 
topical than ever.  
The concept of corporate governance roots in the principal agent theory, according to 
which the increasing separation of ownership and control (management) going along 
with the individual utility maximization desires of the management results in 
information asymmetries and as a consequence in management decisions that are not in 
the best interest of the owners (shareholders) (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Such decisions could be investments in less profitable but highly 
prestigious projects or short term profit maximization at the cost of environmental or 
social intactness. Thus, companies suffering from these agency conflicts are 
characterized by ineffective monitoring systems and disciplining mechanisms aligning 
management and shareholder interests (Renders et al., 2010). Basically, three main 
developments are assumed to be the drivers for the increased awareness and 
importance of corporate governance (Schaefers et al., 2008): Firstly, the increasing 
institutionalization of shareholding further promotes the separation of ownership and 
control which in turn leads to investors anticipating corporate governance quality in 
their investment decisions. Consequently, listed corporations are under pressure to 
adopt international corporate governance standards (Gillan and Starks, 2003; Kohl, 
2009). Secondly, the globalization triggers the further integration of capital markets, 
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leading to increased competition for international capital. Bad corporate governance is 
associated with increased financial risk and hence is compensated by significantly 
higher risk premia that in turn have negative impacts on the corporate valuation 
(Raskop, 2004; Claessens, 2006). These mainly private economy related governance 
issues become serious problems for national economies when bad governed 
corporations are too big to fail and large bail out programs are initiated by the 
government at tax-payers cost to take protective steps as it was the case in the financial 
crisis of 2007/2008.  
The results of these past developments were mandatory or obligatory corporate 
governance codes in various countries of the world. In this context, the focus is on the 
board of directors as one of the most important governance mechanisms that is assumed 
to be the extension of shareholders in controlling the management. Thus, the board of 
directors has a critical function of monitoring the management actions on the one hand 
and advising the management on strategic issues on the other hand. Since every listed 
company has a board of directors, the performance effects of having such a board cannot 
be examined due to the lack of variation in the variable of interest. Therefore, one 
stream of research examines the attributes of the board that is: which composition of 
board of directors could be responsible for differences in performance across 
companies? In this context, it is analyzed what differences across boards increase the 
board effectiveness and hence have positive impacts on companies’ outcomes, in 
particular the corporate financial performance. Among others, determinants of board of 
directors’ effectiveness are assumed to be director demographic diversity in the sense of 
educational background, age, gender, race and ethnicity (Carpenter et al., 2004; Joshi et 
al., 2011; Joecks et al., 2013; Harjoto et al., 2015). Diverse boards are expected to be 
more effective because individuals with a broader set of experience, knowledge, age and 
status can broaden the perspectives and views, have different and unconventional ideas, 
increase creativity and by this the problem-solving competencies of top management 
teams. Hence, diverse boards are assumed to promote effective group dynamics and 
decision-making processes (Carter et al., 2003; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Harjato et al., 
2015). However, cognitive frames are difficult to capture, thus observable 
characteristics such as age, gender or ethnicities are taken as approximations (Krishnan 
and Park, 2005; Dezsö and Ross, 2012). Another factor suggested to influence director’s 
decision-making abilities is human capital characteristics. These board director 
characteristics comprise the skills and experiences ranging from industry knowledge, 
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CEO leadership experience, finance and venture capital experience to board tenure 
familiarities with events such as CEO firing or the general familiarity with the company 
and its sector they are overseeing (McDonald et al., 2008; Kor and Sundaramurthy, 
2009; Fahlenbrach et al., 2010; Johnson et al., 2013).  
Besides the individuals’ demographic and the human capital characteristics, the status of 
board of directors and the board activity are major topics of research. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) invoked first about the role of insider – non-independent – and 
outsider – independent – board members. Many following researchers focused on the 
status of board members underlining that outside and independent director are more 
likely to protect shareholders’ interests by exercising higher control. Alongside to 
investigations on the status of board members, another large stream of research 
attempts to link board size to firm performance, theorizing that smaller boards 
dominated by mainly outside directors are more efficient, suffer less from director free-
riding and are hence value relevant (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). Contrary, some scholars 
also argue that the larger the decision-making group the less extreme and risky the 
decisions are (Sah and Stiglitz, 1986, 1991). As such, Cheng (2008) prove that 
companies with larger boards experience lower performance volatility. Also, the 
intensity of board activity approximated by the number of board meetings per year is 
further analyzed as a value-driving attribute of board effectiveness. Regular meetings 
are expected to increase the monitoring abilities of directors since information can be 
shared and new ideas can be exchanged among outside directors as well as the 
management. As a result, boards with higher meeting frequencies are more likely to put 
shareholder interests first and perform their duties according to these maxims (Vafeas, 
1999). However, critical voices comment that outside directors are accepting too many 
outside directorships which in turn have negative impacts on the meeting attendance 
frequency (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). Also, increased meeting frequency could be an 
indication for the lower decision-effectiveness of the board. This short overview has 
revealed that research results are still mixed. Also, when it comes to the different 
corporate governance requirements across different sectors, research results are quite 
limited. For instance, the real estate industry is assumed to have specific corporate 
governance needs due to the opacities arising out of the particularities of real estate 
properties. Research on the link between governance and real estate performance, 
however, is quite scarce and if given, quite reduced to the U.S. Real estate market. This 
article attempts to close this research gap by extending previous work to the following 
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new dimensions: It analyses the financial performance effects of several board attributes 
by using raw level data instead of the common dichotomous or ratio approach (e.g. 
Gompers et al., 2003). In order to emphasize the differences between raw data approach 
and aggregated governance ratings, in a first step, rating results are compared for 
different industrial sub-samples. Furthermore, the unbalanced panel data set is one of 
the most comprehensive ones covering a maximum of 2,976 companies over 13 years in 
almost all countries and economies. Thus, it is one of the most comprehensive studies 
using the Asset4ESG governance data provided by Thomson Reuters. Also, to our best 
knowledge, the most innovative part is the in-depth analysis of the corporate 
governance effects on a global basis for the real estate industry. Another positive aspect 
of this article is the comparative analysis of different sectors in order to find out, 
whether previous literatures’ findings hold for all industries.  
Our results show a negative correlation between board size and corporate financial 
performance. This result holds for all companies’ sizes and for all sectors confirming 
major research in this field. However, concerning the other board characteristics, the 
results reveal, that there is no one good governance attribute all companies should adopt 
in order to generate positive financial performance effects. Quite the contrary, when it 
comes to the effect of board activity approximated by the number of annual board 
meetings or the number of non-executive and independent board members, the results 
reveal variations across several parameters. As such, real estate companies and smaller 
companies (in terms of total assets), necessitate greater control exercised by the 
internal governance mechanism – board of directors. In contrast to this, for the utilities 
and consumer goods sector and for larger companies the characteristics of this internal 
control mechanism are not value relevant. Thus, the value relevance of governance has 
to be determined in a holistic approach considering the company environment.  
The paper is structured into 6 sections: The following section considers theoretical 
background information on corporate governance characteristics by reviewing main 
empirical works and develops the hypotheses. This chapter also addresses the real 
estate industry and its specific corporate governance needs. Section 3 is devoted to the 
methodology and sample characteristics and is followed by the empirical results and 
robustness checks in section 4 and 5. The conclusion in section 6 sums up the results 
and provides some conclusive remarks.  
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4.2 Theoretical background and research hypotheses 
4.2.1 Board characteristics and firm performance 
Generally, there are mainly two kinds of board of director roles: Firstly, outside 
directors that have non-management functions, advise the CEO and primarily exercise 
control over top management and secondly, inside directors whose main duties 
comprise strategic management activities. As the board is acting on behalf of the 
shareholders in monitoring and managing the company, outside directors are expected 
to be more independent the fewer ties (e.g. professional, social or the fact, that the CEO 
exerts power over them) they have with the executive management, in particular with 
the CEO. Studies trying to assess the independence of outside directors according to 
their ties to the CEO mostly differentiate between “affiliated” and “non-affiliated” 
outside directors (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988, 1991). This independence in turn has 
direct impacts on the monitoring activities that is the greater the board independence is 
the better the management activities of executive board members are monitored. In this 
context, Fogel et al. (2014) state that strong and independent boards generate 4.2 % 
higher Tobin’s Q-ratios all else being equal. Duchin et al. (2010) extend the performance 
implications of independent directors to the costs for information gathering. The 
authors conclude that if the costs of acquiring information about the firm are low, 
corporate performance increases with additional outside directors, and vice versa. 
Deutsch et al. (2010) focus on the risk implications of stock option plans for a large U.S. 
sample of S&P companies over the period from 1997-2006. The results imply that 
implementing stock option plans for CEO and/or independent board members increases 
the corporate risk-taking. The effect is stronger for independent board members 
compared to CEO. However, the effect is substituting when both – CEO as well as 
independent directors – are granted with stock options, that is: independent directors 
have a risk-moderating impact on the CEO’s risk-taking incentives. A country-specific 
study with positive results is undertaken by Black and Kim (2012). The authors analyze 
the impact of board structure on corporate performance for Korean companies. As a 
consequence of the financial crisis in 1997-1998, the Korean government announced a 
legislative initiative to reform corporate board structure. According to this initiative of 
1999, large Korean companies are obliged to implement a minimum of 50% 
independent directors on corporate boards by latest 2001. The authors identified the 
announcement of this legislation as an external shock and analyzed its valuation-
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impacts by means of an event study. The results show that with the announcement of 
the initiative in 1999, investors react positively by valuing large companies compared to 
mid-sized ones higher, that is 13 % higher Tobin’s Q and 46 % higher share price. Later 
in 2000 and 2001 when the initiative becomes effective, Black and Kim identify no 
value-corrective actions anymore. Also, for smaller companies adopting the legislative 
requirements in subsequent years, the value increasing effect is observable.  
However, the results are ambiguous as Yermack (1996) and Agrawal and Knoeber 
(2001) find a negative correlation between the number of outside directors and Tobin’s 
Q. Also, Bhagat & Black (2002) examine the link between the degree of board 
independence (measured as the difference between the ratio of independent to 
dependent board directors) and a variety of performance indicators. The results show 
that firms with low profitability tend to increase the level of independence on the board. 
However, they cannot find any performance-related evidence that this strategy works. 
Companies with a higher ratio of independent board of directors do not outperform 
their peers with lower board independence.   
Concerning the size of the board, early scholars like Lipton and Lorsch (1992) suggest 
that many boards are inefficient due to their large size being an obstacle to meaningful 
discussions. Yermack (1996) finds proof for the higher effectiveness of smaller boards. 
In a sample of 452 U.S. companies between 1984 and 1991, the author determines an 
inverse relationship between board size and Tobin’s Q.  A similar study is performed by 
Faleye (2003) with results showing that a large board hinders the board’s ability to 
perform its monitoring function. The research results of Cheng et al. (2008) indicate that 
companies with large board size have lower performance variability. Hence, the size of 
the board is negatively correlated to, among others, Tobin’s Q, the monthly stock returns 
and annual return on assets proving that larger boards are less extreme in their 
decisions since it takes more compromise to reach consensus. Examining a large sample 
of 2,746 listed companies in the UK over 1981-2002, Guest (2009) finds a strong 
negative link between board size and firm performance (Tobin’s Q and share return). 
The effect is larger for large companies which tend to have larger boards.  
Also, for the banking sector, Pathan et al. (2011) show a negative correlation between 
size and performance, being more pronounced in the post Sarban Oxley Act of 2002. 
However, research by Bhagat and Black (2002) reveal no robust correlation between 
size and performance for a long-term study for the U.S. For the banking sector, Adams 
and Mehran (2008) find a positive link between size and performance.  
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4.2.2 The real estate industry’s good governance needs 
Among practitioners it is assumed that compared to other sectors, the real estate 
industry particularly needs good corporate governance structures which mainly results 
out of the sector specifications as well as the attributes of real estate properties itself. 
That is among others the site-dependency and the heterogeneity of real estate rooting in 
individual design in combination with location and type of usage. Furthermore, the real 
estate sector is determined by a lack of transparency concerning the real market value of 
properties. This is mainly due to the real estate markets being shaped by local 
conditions, flexibilities in valuations and national valuation methods further 
exacerbating opacity. Thus, information gathering is quite costly, leading to 
inefficiencies in the market. As a consequence, shareholders have difficulties to assess 
and control transactions which further trigger the principal agent problems. Moreover, 
another, further complicating aspect is that these large assets are predominantly under 
fiduciary administration. Also, listed real estate companies and REITs related aspects 
further necessitate good governance. An example for the wide-held assumption that real 
estate and construction companies need good corporate governance is the German 
initiative “Initiative Corporate Governance der deutschen Immobilienwirtschaft e.V.” 
which, founded in 2002 by main practitioners and scholars of the sector, aims to 
produce and establish principles for transparent and professional corporate 
management in the real estate business. 8 Empirical results for the governance effects in 
the real estate literature are quite scarce and the given few are focused on the U.S. REIT 
market. The reason for this unbalanced distribution is the comparably high data 
transparency of the U.S. REIT market compared to other countries. Early scholars have 
analyzed the link between top management compensation and key performance 
indicators for real estate companies. The results show a strong significant positive 
correlation between compensation and total assets as well as earnings per share (Davis 
and Shelor, 1995). Based on these preliminary analyses, Friday and Sirmans (1998) 
focus on the composition of the board of directors in U.S. REITs and its impact on 
shareholder value. The results show that the ratio of independent board members is 
positively linked to the market-to-book value of REITs. However, this effect only exists 
until the threshold ratio of 50 %. Boards with higher numbers of independent board 
members have rather decreasing market-to-book values. Furthermore, the results show 
                                                     
8  http://www.immo-initiative.de/en/. 
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a higher institutional ownership for REITs with good governance as well as an 
outperformance of this group over a period of two years. Kohl (2009) analyzes for 
Europe the performance effects of board composition and transparency for listed real 
estate companies. The results indicate that the board size has negative impacts on 
Tobin’s Q while stock options based compensation has rather positive effects. However, 
Hartzell et al. (2004) examine the link between board size, board independence, block 
ownership and institutional ownership to find no effects on Tobin’s Q.  Other rating 
based studies find a positive correlation between governance rating and REIT 
performance (Bauer et al., 2010), however, the effect is only present for REITs with low 
payout ratios indicating a “REIT-effect”. In a multi-country analysis, Edelstein et al. 
(2010) determine the country-specific governance quality as a factor for excess real 
estate returns (i.e. required risk premium).  
4.2.3 Hypotheses 
Considering the presented previous literature, this work is going to undertake a 
comprehensive study covering a total sample of 2,976 companies over a period of 13 
years. The analysis focuses on the link between four board characteristics – size, 
meeting frequency, percentage of non-executive and independent board members – and 
corporate financial performance approximated by Tobin’s Q. This analysis is also 
undertaken for 394 real estate companies and REITs in 40 countries. Furthermore, using 
a fixed effect panel data model, it is possible to control for country as well as firm 
specific effects, possibly influencing the performance effects of governance quality. Also, 
to our best knowledge, this is the first study also controlling for diversity effects. In 
addition to the performance impacts of board attributes in the real estate industry, this 
article undertakes comparisons to other sectors.  
Hence, taking the aforementioned explanation into consideration, we aim to analyze the 
following hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 1.1:  Board size has a negative impact on financial performance. 
Hypothesis 1.2:  The percentage of non-executive/independent board members has a 
positive impact on financial performance.  
Hypothesis 1.3:  High board meeting frequency increases financial performance.  
-86-  
 
Hypothesis 2:   The performance implications of board attributes are specifically higher 
for real estate and construction companies, reflecting the industry’s 
specific governance requirements. 
Hypothesis 3:  The need for specific governance attributes depend on company 
particularities such as sector and size.  
4.3 Methodology and summary statistics 
4.3.1 Sample selection 
The critical sustainability variables of this article are based on the Asset4ESG database 
by Thomson Reuters. The initial sample covered 3,799 companies from all sectors and 
industries as well as geographical regions. This sample is adjusted for financial 
companies due to their different financial as well as governance requirements. The 
resulting final sample consists of 2,976 companies from 55 countries over a period of 13 
years (2003-2015) comprising an unbalanced panel data set of 18,335 observations. As 
already stated, the data on board composition is derived from Thomson Reuters’ 
Asset4ESG database that rates since 2001 more than 4500 companies worldwide on 
sustainability aspects and publishes the results on an annual basis. The necessary 
information are collected manually from all publicly available sources and verified in a 
comprehensive procedure. Hence, the Asset4ESG rating is one of the most sophisticated 
and extensive databases on sustainability.  
The rating is calculated in several steps. On the basis 400 individual data points 
companies’ environmental, financial, governance and social performance are evaluated. 
These raw-level data points are aggregated to more than 70 key performance indicators 
which in turn are used to calculate the category scores for the three sustainability 
pillars: environmental, governance and social sustainability score. A final aggregation to 
the overall sustainability score is achieved by a weighted calculation of the pillar scores.  
4.3.2 Measures and descriptive statistics 
Organizational performance is characterized as multi-dimensional in research (e.g. 
Miller et al., 2013). In this context, a prevalent dimension is market returns. While other 
accounting performance oriented measures refer to past or short term financial 
performance and mainly determine how good a company is in utilizing its assets to 
generate earnings (Easterwood et al., 2012; Post and Byron, 2015), market performance 
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measures comprise external perceptions and expectations of the long-term, future 
performance of an asset. This market valuation of a company is reflected by Tobin’s Q, 
widely used as market performance measure in research (among others: Hartzell et al., 
2004; Kohl, 2009; Guest, 2009). Tobin’s Q is approximated by calculating the sum of the 
market value of equity and the book value of debt, divided by the book value of total 
assets. A Tobin’s Q-ratio greater than 1 indicates that for the shareholders the company 
has a higher value than stated in the balance sheet. However, a value less than 1 reflects 
investors’ expectation about the company destroying value in the future rather than 
building it up.  
Independent variables of interest are several board characteristics reported as annual 
data points by Thomson Reuters. These are the board size (SIZE) measured as the 
number board members at the end of fiscal year. As already explained in the previous 
sections, non-executive directors have monitoring and controlling tasks in the board. 
Hence, analyzing the number of board size itself might not be meaningful without any 
information about the distribution of executive and non-executive directors on the 
board. Hence, NON-EX measures the number of non-executive board directors. In this 
context, the status of independent and dependent plays an important role. The indicator 
value variable INDEPENDENT comprises the percentage of independent board members 
as reported by the company. The value ranges between 0 and 100 percent. The variable 
MEETINGS comprises the number of board meetings during the year, including all 
special meetings. This variable is deemed to be an approximation for the interaction, i.e. 
the activity of the board of directors. All board-related variables are derived from 
Thomson Reuters’ Asset4ESG database. Besides these raw data, three governance 
ratings are used in an initial comparative approach. Firstly, the total corporate 
governance pillar score (CGVSCORE) measures the company’s systems and processes 
that ensures the board is acting in the shareholders’ best interest. The subordinated 
category score board functions (CGBF) captures the company’s management 
commitment and effectiveness towards following best practice corporate governance 
principles related to board activities and functions.9 The category score board structure 
(CGBS) measures a company’s ability to ensure a well balanced board membership. 
These three ratings are used in an initial step to compare the sub-samples according to 
their overall governance quality.  
                                                     
9  Asset4ESG rating description. 
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The control variables included in the analysis are chosen according to the most common 
corporate performance determinants as identified by empirical research (e.g. Florackis 
and Ozkan, 2009; Terjesen et al., 2016). In this context, major corporate aspects with 
performance implications to control for are the company size, industry and risk 
(Margolis and Walsh, 2001; Carter et al., 2003; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Boulouta, 
2013; Harjoto et al., 2015). The natural logarithm of total assets controls for the 
company size. The natural logarithm of total debt is expected to control for corporate 
risk (Miller and Bromiley, 1990; Waddock and Graves, 1997; Boulouta, 2013; Orlitzky 
and Benjamin, 2013; Harjoto et al., 2015). Broadly diversified companies are expected to 
be more complex. Complex companies in turn are assumed to have larger boards and 
greater needs for sophisticated corporate governance systems. Hence, the variable 
capital expenditures (capex) serves as an approximation for company diversification. 
The operational performance is captured by sales growth, calculated as the net sales 
growth within a year (Harjato et al., 2015). Further measures controlled for are the 
natural logarithm of free float (the percentage of shares in free float), dividend yield and 
the ratio of earnings before interest and tax (ebit) to sales as a measure for company’s 
profitability. The financial measures are taken from Datastream. In order to control for 
any serial correlation among the dependent variables, at least the first lag is used as 
independent variable in the regression analysis. In the sense of dynamic panel data 
analysis, this is a quite common approach in research (see e.g. Harjoto et al., 2015; Isidro 
and Sobral, 2015). 
As a robustness check, the sub-sample analysis for different geographical regions is 
used.   
In order to provide some initial assessment of the sample, board structures and key 
indicators across different sub-samples are compared. For the main sample, the 
statistics are presented in exhibit 4.1.   
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The descriptive statistics provide an overview over important aspects of the total 
sample. Concerning financial performance, the sample’s Tobin’s Q ranges between the 
maximum of 2.8787 and the minimum of 0.0001, while the average company has a 
Tobin’s Q of 0.2509. The median of 0.2329 is quite close to the mean, indicating an even 
distribution of the data around the mean and no great outliers distorting the results.  
Concerning board of director ratings, the statistical examination of the two governance 
category scores CGBF and CGBS exhibits a very similar distribution for both scores. The 
mean score is 63.6209 % for CGBF with a standard deviation of 25.1900 % and 63.8327 
% for CGBS with a respective variation of 25.5783 % around mean. For board functions, 
the minimum score is 2.3900 %, while the maximum score is 93.3000 %. Concerning 
board structure these values range between 1.7500 % and 96.1900 %. Hence, the 
sample contains the whole range of companies with exemplary good corporate 
governance and companies with worse governance which is quite useful for the further 
regression analysis. Breaking down this category score into their four selected elements, 
the distribution shows that the average company in the sample has about 10 board 
members, whereby the minimum number of directors is 3 and the largest board 
comprises 31 board members. The median of 10 indicates a quite even distribution. 
Furthermore, the average company has about 78.4697 % non-executive directors. Since 
Exhibit 4.1| Descriptive statistics of the total sample  
   Mean  Median Max. Min.   Std. Dev. # Obs. 
Tobin’s Q 0.2509 0.2329 2.8787 0.0001 0.1873 18,353 
CGVSCORE 63.5714 70.4800 98.7800 1.3500 24.8366 18,353 
CGBF 63.6209 73.7200 93.3000 2.3900 25.1900 18,353 
CGBS 63.8327 73.0800 96.1900 1.7500 25.5783 18,353 
Independent 66.0371 70.0000 100.0000 3.7000 21.7274 18,353 
Meetings 8.8753 8.0000 36.0000 3.0000 4.1041 18,353 
Non-Ex 78.4697 83.3300 100.0000 4.1700 16.9316 18,353 
Size 10.0671 10.0000 31.0000 3.0000 2.9910 18,353 
Total Debt 3,672,874 910,400 432,362,000 0,00 15,761,751 18,353 
Total Assets 15,230,622 3,957,001 1,029,139,000 17,585 48,497,902 18,353 
Capex 599,186.61 111,049.30 38,378,803.84 49.3830 1,740,227.00 18,353 
Free Float 74.3306 81.0000 100.0000 2.0000 22.4841 18,353 
Sales Growth 0.1054 0.0729 1.6735 -0.8308 0.2409 18,353 
Ebit Sales 
Ratio 
0.1538 0.1182 0.9293 -0.5219 0.1684 18,353 
Dividend 
Yield 
2.3726 1.8700 281.4500 0.0000 3.3389 18,353 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
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the sample covers one-tier as well as two tier board model, the maximum of 100 % 
should be interpreted for the two-tier board system where the supervisory board only 
comprises non-executive board members. In the ordinary least squares regression 
analysis, the fixed effects panel model will control for the effects of different board 
systems. The average board has 66.0371 % independent directors. Within the sample, 
there are also companies with 100 % independent directors as well as the minimum of 
3.70 %. The explanation for the large gap and the maximum number is similar to that of 
non-executive directors. When it comes to the single governance elements of the CGBF 
score, the results exhibit that the average board meets about 8.8753 times a year. 
However, the maximum of 36 meetings is about four times higher. An explanation for 
this high meeting frequency could be special circumstances such as merger and 
acquisitions or major developments in the corporate strategy necessitating higher 
exchange of information.  
The further financial and general company data show the following structure: The 
average company has total debt of 3,672,874 EUR. The maximum number is 
432,362,000 EUR with a standard deviation of 15,761,751 EUR. The total assets range 
between 17,585 EUR and 1,029,139,000 EUR with a mean of 15,230,622 EUR and a 
median of 3,957,001 EUR exhibiting good variation in the sample. The sample statistics 
uncover an average free float of 74.3306 %. High free float numbers indicate an 
increased attempt to shareholder value maximization. However, high free float also 
shifts the power more to the management. Hence, good governance becomes specifically 
important. The mean sales growth is about 10.5400 % while the average operating 
profit margin approximated by the ebit sales ratio is 15.3800 %. The average company 
in the sample has a dividend yield of 2.3726. Several of the variables will be used as 
logged in the analysis to correct for skewness.  
The descriptive statistics of the various sub-samples (real estate, industry, utilities & 
consumer goods and technology) concerning sustainability variables are presented in 
exhibit 4.2.  
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Exhibit 4.2| Descriptive statistics of various sub-samples  
 
 
Exhibit 4.2.1|Descriptive statistics real estate sub-sample concerning governance 
characteristics 
Mean Median Max. Min. Std. Dev. # Obs. 
CGVSCORE 65.33 70.70 97.15 3.01 22.54 1177 
CGBS 68.18 77.67 94.02 2.97 24.12 1177 
CGBF 66.32 75.72 92.65 5.85 22.68 1177 
Size 9.80 10.00 22.00 4.00 2.75 1177 
Non-Ex 76.39 81.82 100.00 12.50 16.61 1177 
Independent  66.59 70.00 100.00 10.00 20.44 1177 
Meetings 8.38 7.00 33.00 3.00 4.04 1177 
Exhibit 4.2.2|Descriptive statistics industry sub-sample concerning governance characteristics 
Mean Median Max. Min. Std. Dev. # Obs. 
CGVSCORE 69.62 75.76 96.81 1.53 21.65 2257 
CGBS 69.34 78.20 93.72 2.42 22.69 2257 
CGBF 68.09 77.14 92.23 2.49 21.40 2257 
Size 9.89 10.00 23.00 3.00 2.57 2257 
Non-Ex 80.13 85.71 100.00 14.29 14.60 2257 
Independent  70.51 75.00 100.00 10.00 19.87 2257 
Meetings 8.26 8.00 25.00 3.00 3.25 2257 
Exhibit 4.2.3|Descriptive statistics utilities & consumer goods sub-sample concerning 
governance characteristics 
Mean Median Max. Min. Std. Dev. # Obs. 
CGVSCORE 69.68 75.25 97.90 2.12 20.91 3494 
CGBS 69.57 77.84 96.19 2.90 22.20 3494 
CGBF 69.37 78.57 93.12 2.44 20.74 3494 
Size 10.76 11.00 23.00 4.00 2.68 3494 
Non-Ex 80.58 84.62 100.00 14.29 13.90 3494 
Independent  68.59 73.33 100.00 6.25 19.97 3494 
Meetings 8.33 8.00 36.00 3.00 3.61 3494 
      
Exhibit 4.2.4|Descriptive statistics technology sub-sample concerning governance 
characteristics 
Mean Median Max. Min. Std. Dev. # Obs. 
CGVSCORE 70.63 77.44 97.36 2.73 21.89 1030 
CGBS 68.73 78.49 95.36 2.72 24.34 1030 
CGBF 68.85 79.35 92.88 2.82 22.31 1030 
Size 10.01 10.00 22.00 3.00 2.72 1030 
Non-Ex 82.35 85.71 100.00 16.67 12.98 1030 
Independent  71.49 77.78 100.00 12.50 20.20 1030 
Meetings 9.11 8.00 35.00 4.00 3.94 1030 
Source: Own illustration. 
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Exhibit 4.2 presents an overview of different board characteristics for the real estate, 
industry, utilities & consumer goods and technology sub-samples. The comparative 
results show that concerning board governance all industries are quite close to each 
other, though slight differences can be determined: As such, the real estate industry has 
on average the smallest board size with 9.80 directors. However, the real estate sector 
has also the lowest percentage of non-executive and independent board members. These 
non-executive and especially, independent directors in turn are suggested to be 
essential for good and sufficient corporate control. Hence, the comparably low internal 
control mechanisms support the previous assumptions about the specific governance 
needs of real estate and construction companies. An initial comparison of the overall 
governance score confirms this perception: the real estate industry has the lowest 
CGVSCORE (average 65.33 %, with the lowest median being 70.70 %). Already this 
initial comparison helps to have a first indication for the hypothesis. When taking 
governance ratings as a comparison factor, the real estate industry suffers from lower 
corporate governance quality compared to the utilities, technology and industrial 
sectors. The following regression analysis focuses on whether these average differences 
in governance have an impact on the corporate performance, i.e. whether, in particular, 
real estate and construction companies would increase financial performance by 
investing in the four board characteristics mentioned previously.  
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  Tobin's Q CGVSCORE CGBF CGBS 
Indepen-
dent 
Meetings Non-Ex Size 
Total 
Debt 
Leve- 
rage 
Total 
Assets 
Capex 
Free 
Float 
Sales 
Growth 
Ebit 
sales 
Ratio 
Divi-
dend 
Yield 
Tobin’s Q 1 
        
 
      
CGVSCORE 0.0011 1 
       
 
      
CGBF 0.0225*** 0.7938*** 1 
      
 
      
CGBS -0.0118 0.7452*** 0.6824*** 1 
     
 
      
Independent -0.0039 0.5501*** 0.5804*** 0.5895*** 1 
    
 
      
Meetings 0.0805*** -0.0065 0.0180** -0.0498*** -0.0639*** 1 
   
 
      
Non-Ex 0.0288*** 0.3642*** 0.3999*** 0.3326*** 0.6264*** -0.0816*** 1 
  
 
      
Size 0.0699*** 0.0196*** 0.0213*** -0.1640*** -0.1234*** -0.0849*** 0.0566*** 1 
 
 
      
Total Debt 0.1618*** 0.0464*** 0.0378*** -0.0027 0.0188** 0.0793*** 0.0337*** 0.1720*** 1  
      
Leverage 0.9290*** 0.0677*** 0.1031*** 0.0857*** 0.0591*** 0.0453*** 0.0555*** -0.0134* 0.0696*** 1 
      
Total Assets -0.0153** 0.0695*** 0.0562*** -0.0108 0.0301*** 0.0680*** 0.0532*** 0.2297*** 0.7321*** 
-0 .0865 
*** 
1 
     
Capex 0.0272*** 0.0696*** 0.0290*** -0.0317*** 0.0125* 0.0485*** 0.0356*** 0.2113*** 0.3128*** -0.0163** 0.4152*** 1 
    
Free Float 0.0030 0.3474*** 0.2850*** 0.3300*** 0.3685*** 0.0778*** 0.0914*** -0.0784*** 0.0489*** 0.0342*** 0.0666*** 0.0155** 1    
Sales Growth 0.0024 -0.0123* -0.0079 -0.0066 -0.0117 -0.0116 0.0031 0.0038 -0.0023 0.0029 -0.0029 -0.0022 -0.0082 1   
Ebit Sales Ratio 0.0112 0.0048 -0.0038 0.0024 0.0033 -0.0206*** -0.0008 0.0190** 0.0059 -0.0003 0.0076 0.0068 -0.0103 0.0004 1  
Dividend Yield 0.1125*** 0.0065 -0.0320*** -0.0286*** -0.0432*** 0.0671*** 0.0263*** 0.0389*** 0.0279*** 0.0928*** 0.0413*** 0.0451*** 0.0271*** -0.0075 0.0187** 1 
Exhibit 4.3| Correlations of the variables     
This exhibit 4.3 shows the Pearson Correlations for the variables used in the analysis. The significance level is according to the p-values: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01, t-values in 
parenthesis. The governance scores CGVSCORE, CGBF and CGBS indicate high correlations with each other. Therefore, these variables are not used simultaneously. 
Source: Own illustration. 
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4.4 Empirical results 
4.4.1 Empirical results for the complete data set 
The core part of the empirical analysis is the examination of the link between corporate 
board attributes and corporate financial performance by means of multivariate ordinary 
least squares regression analysis while controlling for external factors determining 
financial performance (e.g. company size and risk). As an initial step of the panel 
regression, the appropriateness of a fixed or random effects model for the regression 
analysis is determined. For this purpose, the Hausman test is applied which is based on 
the essential assumption that the random effects are not correlated with any 
explanatory variables. Consequently, the results of the test end up in a p-value of 0.000 
indicating the abandonment of the random effects model (results not tabulated here). 
Hence, the resulted fixed effects model controls for time-invariant firm and country 
specific attributes. Since multicollinearity is one of the major problems of panel data, at 
least the first lag of the dependent variable is included as an explanatory factor. In order 
to determine the right number of lags, the analysis is repeated with different lags until 
the best model fit is found and multicollinearity is eliminated. Mostly, these are three 
lags of Tobin’s Q. This approach is performed also for the hereafter following ordinary 
least squares estimations. The variance inflation factor ranged less than 5 and the 
Durbin Watson test is about 2 indicating no serious multicollinearity. Furthermore, 
white cross section coefficient covariance method is chosen to control for 
heteroscedasticity. Since the total sample of up to 18,353 observations suffered from 
skewness, the natural logarithm of the respective parameters is taken. The regression 
results of the total unbalanced sample are tabulated in exhibit 4.4.   
Exhibit 4.4| Regression results for board characteristics with Tobin’s Q    
 
Dependent variable 
Tobin’s Q 
Size  
-0.001485*** 
(4.51302) 
Meetings  
0.001442*** 
(3.467573) 
Non-Ex  
-0.000197 
(1.233243) 
Independent  
0.000103* 
(1.702484) 
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Total Debt (log) 
0.062439*** 
(15.704261) 
Total Assets (log) 
-0.06764*** 
(8.139438) 
Capex (log) 
0.004998*** 
(2.724142) 
Free Float (log) 
-0.001465 
(0.355808) 
Sales Growth 
-0.000956* 
(1.801717) 
Dividend Yield 
0.000489 
(1.547418) 
Ebit Sales Ratio 
0.000319*** 
(4.157102) 
Tobin’s Q (1 lag) 
0.372061*** 
(6.537319) 
Tobin’s Q (2lag) 
-0.052367** 
(1.963159) 
Tobin’s Q (3 lag) 
-0.052486** 
(2.474347) 
  
C 
0.340076*** 
(3.817643) 
Fixed Effects Yes 
R² 0.8925 
# Observations 15,294 
Significance of coefficients are marked as *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 while t-values are given in 
parenthesis. 
Source: Own illustration.  
 
The results of the regression analysis show that the size of the board has a significant 
negative correlation with the market performance (Tobin’s Q), though the magnitude of 
the correlation is weak (-0.001485). However, the coefficient is significant at the 1 % 
significance level. Concerning the meeting frequency of the board of directors, the 
results reveal a significant positive correlation with Tobin’s Q. Hence, from the market 
performance point of view, the general expectation of a positive correlation is 
confirmed. In other words, investors’ assumption about boards that meet up more 
frequently and by this exchange ideas and information faster and perform its monitoring 
duties more accurately is generally confirmed. Thus, a high meeting frequency might 
trigger the general market beliefs and impressions that the directors’ are busy in 
exchanging information and exercising desired control.  
Moreover, in contrast to previous research, the percentage of non-executive directors 
has a negative impact on financial performance. This result is quite interesting because 
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non-executive directors are generally expected to monitor the top management and 
increasing the number of non-executive directors in the board is expected to increase 
the performance due to better governance. However, the coefficient of the variable Non-
Ex is not significant at any of the common significance level, indicating that the role of 
the directors is not value relevant in a holistic sample approach. In contrast to this, 
directors’ independence has a significant positive impact. Hence, from the market 
performance view, the independence of directors’ is value relevant. Consequently, 
adding non-executive directors’ may not add to board effectiveness if independence is 
not given. The models’ goodness of fit R² is 0.8925 which means that about 90 % of the 
variations can be explained by the model.  
4.4.2 Empirical results for various sub-samples 
In order to get further insights into possible sector specific effects of board attributes, an 
analysis for different sub-samples is undertaken. The intention is to find out whether the 
above stated results also hold for different sectors. The assumption is that governance 
needs are specifically determined by company’s environment and thus subject to 
variations. The results of this additional sub-sample analysis are presented in exhibit 
4.5. 
Exhibit 4.5| Regression results for board characteristics with Tobin’s Q for 
different sub-samples   
 
Dependent variable 
Tobin’s Q 
Sub-sample 
Utilities & consumer 
goods 
Technology Industrial 
Size  
-0.001321*** 
(2.856353) 
-0.00222** 
(2.079821) 
-0.001635* 
(1.711376) 
Meetings  
0.000764 
(1.642433) 
0.000232 
(0.565561) 
0.001016** 
(2.019879) 
Non-Ex  
-0.000189 
(0.862400) 
-0.000823*** 
(2.852598) 
0.0000495*** 
(0.342286) 
Independent  
-0.00000711 
(0.066822) 
0.00091*** 
(3.018193) 
-0.000129 
(1.583573) 
Total Debt (log) 
0.065903*** 
(14.62494) 
0.05438*** 
(12.48311) 
0.046149*** 
(8.702992) 
Total Assets (log) 
-0.061675*** 
(8.559638) 
-0.047082*** 
(5.509881) 
-0.01925* 
(1.898376) 
Capex (log) 
0.007346*** 
(3.096533) 
-0.005454 
(1.102127) 
0.005033 
(1.434212) 
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Free Float (log) 
0.004531 
(0.78074) 
-0.000789 
(0.07501) 
-0.005424 
(0.834004) 
Sales Growth 
-0.001278 
(0.280498) 
-0.010195 
(1.225534) 
0.013305 
(1.576237) 
Dividend Yield 
0.000838 
(0.890965) 
0.002145** 
(2.399618) 
0.000656 
(1.359341) 
Ebit Sales Ratio 
-0.074877*** 
(4.081528) 
-0.105356*** 
(3.763768) 
-0.133965*** 
(6.239968) 
Tobin’s Q (1 lag) 
0.400367*** 
(7.98129) 
0.314391*** 
(4.040668) 
0.393212*** 
(10.96929) 
Tobin’s Q (2 lag) 
-0.042992 
(1.094731) 
-0.087289** 
(2.012703) 
-0.057976* 
(1.89908) 
   
C 
0.150126** 
(2.560177) 
0.288639** 
(2.311137) 
-0.166829 
(1.593026) 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
R² 0.9172 0.887652 0.91623 
# Observations 4,896 1,421 3,140 
Significance of coefficients are marked as *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 while t-values are given in 
parenthesis. 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
The results provide interesting insights into different industries and exhibits for the first 
time that the value relevance of major board characteristics are industry dependent. 
First of all, for all sectors, the size of the board of directors exerts negative significant 
effects on the financial performance while the highest effect is observed for the 
technology sector. The meeting frequency has a positive performance effect in all 
analyzed sub-samples, however, the effect is only significant and the highest for 
companies in the industrial sample. The impact of the number of non-executive and 
independent directors has the highest differences across the sectors. As such, in the 
technology sector it has a significant negative financial effect, while in the industrial sub-
sample the effect is significantly positive, at the highest significance level of 1 %. For the 
utilities & consumer goods sub-sample, the effect is not significant. Hence, companies in 
the technology sector can positively influence their performance by increasing the 
number of independent, non-executive directors. These two characteristics are jointly 
significant. For industrial companies increasing the number of non-executive directors is 
already enough in supporting financial performance in a positive way, since the status, 
whether dependent or independent is irrelevant. Hence, from the important market 
point of view, investors in different sectors, appreciate different board characteristics. In 
the relatively new, fast changing and highly information-affine technology sector, it is 
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important to have a small board of directors with increased number of non-executive 
and independent board members. The status of independence is of significant 
importance for the success of the companies. For the rather relatively long established 
industrial sector, investors appreciate a small board with high meeting frequency and 
large number of non-executive directors. The status of independence has a rather 
negative, hindering impact, though the effect is not significant. The utilities & consumer 
goods industry is the only industry that has the highest value-resistance towards 
changes in the board structure. Generally assumed value-driven determinants such as 
the board activity, the number of non-executive directors or the director’s independence 
are not value relevant. A reason for this could be the exposure of the industry to the 
public based on the nature of their business, the products and services they offer to 
private consumers. For example, a producer of convenience goods is exposed to the 
public and is called to account very quickly for any mistakes harming the customers. 
Missteps can go viral very fast and the resulting image damages can be costly very 
quickly. Hence, the external business environment works itself as a good controlling 
mechanism. Furthermore, high governmental regulations concerning consumer 
protection etc. are further controlling mechanisms for companies in this sector. 
4.4.3 Empirical results for the real estate industry 
Considering that the different sectors are significantly determined by different board 
characteristics it is of special interest to understand how the real estate sector is 
affected in this context. Due to restricted data, only the first lag of the dependent 
variable is used in the estimation model. The results are summed up in exhibit 4.6.  
Exhibit 4.6| Empirical results for the real estate sub-sample 
 
Dependent variable 
Tobin’s Q 
Size  
-0.002847*** 
(2.707572) 
Meetings  
-0.001155 
(1.602758) 
Non-Ex  
0.00024 
(1.0714) 
Independent  
-0.000445*** 
(2.711337) 
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Total Debt (log) 
0.040644*** 
(7.848694) 
Total Assets (log) 
-0.045976*** 
(4.35132) 
Capex (log) 
0.007209*** 
(3.179021) 
Free Float (log) 
0.003036 
(0.408409) 
Sales Growth 
0.001414 
(0.267718) 
Dividend Yield 
0.000468 
(0.588169) 
Ebit Sales Ratio 
-0.038673*** 
(3.81021) 
Tobin’s Q (1 lag) 
0.458055*** 
(9.830266) 
  
C 
0.283463*** 
(3.106687) 
Fixed Effects Yes 
R² 0.9431 
# Observations 1,873 
Significance of coefficients are marked as *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 while t-values are given in 
parenthesis. 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
Firstly, the previous results concerning the negative effects of large corporate boards are 
also confirmed for the real estate sector. Hence, also for real estate and construction 
companies, large board of directors lead to decision-inefficiencies, i.e. the costs of 
additional directors outweighs the benefits of for example additional know-how 
and/diversity. Furthermore, in contrast to other sub-samples (exhibit 4.5), there is an 
inverse relationship between board meeting frequency and corporate market 
performance, approximated by Tobin’s Q. Despite the coefficient is not significant at any 
common significance level, real estate and construction companies do not profit from 
higher meeting frequency, i.e. high meeting frequency is rather an indicator for decision-
lethargy and lower efficiency. Another interesting aspect is that the sector profits from 
increasing percentage of non-executive directors, however, the coefficient of the 
variable is not significant. Furthermore, in contrast to previous literature, independent 
directors in real estate companies’ boards are an obstacle to financial performance. A 
possible reason for this divergent result may be that compared to other sub-samples, 
independent directors may increase controversies arising out of lower homogeneity that 
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in turn leads to less decision and communication efficiency. Thus, the number of 
independent board members might go along with increasing conflicts and as a result in 
lower decision-making efficiency. The coefficient is significant at the strictest 
significance level of 1 %. Hence, from investors’ valuation point of view, real estate 
companies with small boards and lower number of independent board members 
experience highest market valuation.  
The question whether real estate and construction companies have specific governance 
needs can be affirmed partly. The results provide indication that in comparison to other 
sectors, real estate companies do not have specific governance needs when it comes to 
the board size. Like other sectors, real estate and construction companies suffer 
financially from large boards. However, neither meeting frequency nor the control 
exercised by non-executive directors has financial performance impacts like it is the 
case for industrial or technology companies. In addition, contrary to industrial 
companies, independent board members in real estate boards have significant negative 
financial performance implications. Though the effect is also negative for utilities & 
consumer goods as well as technology companies, the coefficients are not significant in 
these cases at any common significance level.  Thus, concerning independent board 
members, the real estate sector has specific needs.  
4.4.4 Empirical results for different company sizes 
Taking the varying results for different sectors into account, the next logical step is to 
analyze whether company specific characteristics, in particular, the company size, 
determine the value-relevance of board attributes. Specifically, the following ordinary 
least squares panel data regression is undertaken for large and small companies to 
determine the performance implications of board of directors’ attributes for these sub-
samples. The initial total sample is divided into small and big companies according to 
the amount of total assets. For this, the median of the total assets is taken. Companies 
larger than the median are indicated as “big”, while companies with total asset smaller 
than the median are assigned as “small”. The results of the unbalanced fixed effects 
panel data regression are presented in the following exhibit 4.7.  
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Exhibit 4.7| Empirical results for small and big companies   
 
 
Dependent variable 
Tobin’s Q 
Small Big 
Size  
-0.002888*** 
(3.585771) 
-0.001321*** 
(2.856353) 
Meetings  
0.002054** 
(2.075843) 
0.000764 
(1.642433) 
Non-Ex  
-0.000464** 
(2.173596) 
-0.000189 
(0.862400) 
Independent  
0.000193* 
(1.824713) 
-0.000007 
(0.066822) 
Total Debt (log) 
0.055026*** 
(12.28621) 
0.065903*** 
(14.62494) 
Total Assets (log) 
-0.05667*** 
(4.921976) 
-0.061675*** 
(8.559638) 
Capex (log) 
0.005347*** 
(4.311949) 
0.007346*** 
(3.096533) 
Free Float (log) 
-0.000382 
(0.075269) 
0.004531 
(0.78074) 
Sales Growth 
0.001638 
(0.223011) 
-0.001278 
(0.280498) 
Dividend Yield 
0.000324 
(1.285975) 
0.000838 
(0.890965) 
Ebit Sales Ratio 
-0.017641 
(0.636692) 
-0.074877*** 
(4.081528) 
Tobin’s Q (1 lag) 
0.338449*** 
(5.990642) 
0.400367*** 
(7.98129) 
Tobin’s Q (2 lag) 
-0.075673** 
(2.463078) 
-0.042992 
(1.094731) 
   
C 
0.284113** 
(2.553385) 
0.150126** 
(2.560177) 
Fixed Effects yes yes 
R² 0.8683 0.91715 
# Observations 5,814 4,896 
Significance of coefficients are marked as *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 while t-values are given in 
parenthesis. 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
The comparison between the two samples reveals that compared to large companies, 
the examined board characteristics have an increased significant impact on the financial 
performance of smaller listed companies. Hence, the internal governance mechanism – 
board of directors – and the structure thereof plays an important value-determining 
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role. Consequently, the corporate governance, i.e. the corporate controlling needs of 
smaller companies are higher compared to larger corporations.  
A detailed consideration of the respective board variables reveals the following 
conclusions: For the variable board size, the results are in accordance to previous 
research and the above determined outcomes for different sectors, i.e. the size of the 
board of directors has significant negative effects on the corporate financial 
performance. Furthermore, the annual meeting frequency has a positive financial 
influence being significant at the 5 % level. Hence, for smaller companies the beneficial 
effects of frequent meetings going along with increased information exchange is higher 
than the costs accrued thereby. Also, a stepwise adding of the four variables of interest, 
shows that the status of independence becomes significant when the variable non-
executive directors is added to the regression equation. Thus, it can be assumed that 
these variables are jointly significant. While the number of non-executive directors 
exerts negative effects, the directors’ status of independence has positive impacts. As a 
result, for smaller companies, it is important to have an independent and small board 
with high meeting frequency. For larger companies, the only financial performance 
affecting characteristic is the board size. A reason for the discrepancy between large and 
small companies could be that due to their size, larger companies are mostly 
multinational and therefore, have other control mechanisms. In this context, the public 
and the government going along with the increased competitiveness and pressure of 
larger companies to maintain good image and publicity are itself effective external 
control mechanisms. Furthermore, international competition for fresh capital increases 
the pressure, too. Therefore, investments in a specific board composition such as 
increasing the number of non-executive and independence directors or the meeting 
frequency to reach a good internal governance/controlling mechanism are not relevant 
for the corporate financial performance of large companies. In contrast to this, smaller 
companies tend to increase their capital from local markets. Furthermore, due to their 
smaller size, the public awareness is comparatively lower. The reason for this are for 
example lower number of employees, lower supra-regional or national impacts and 
certainly also lower tax payments due to lower revenues compared to large, 
multinational companies. Hence, for smaller companies, the pressure out of 
international competition for fresh capital and international positive image is 
comparatively small. Thus, internal governance mechanisms have higher and significant 
financial performance weights. For this group of companies it does pay off to invest in 
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non-executive and independent board members or pay the directors’ fees for additional 
meetings.  
4.5 Robustness test 
The results presented in the previous sections show that the board characteristics of 
interest have varying impact for different samples. Hence, the robustness check is 
performed to explore whether the results are trustworthy. For this, the sample is 
divided into different sub-samples according to geographic regions, in particular 
Europe, U.S. and East & Asia. The following exhibit 4.8 summarizes the results.   
Exhibit 4.8| Empirical results for different geographical regions 
 
Dependent variable 
Tobin’s Q 
Europe U.S. East & Asia 
Size  
-0.002511*** 
(4.664908) 
-0.000544* 
(1.800744) 
-0.001078** 
(2.008809) 
Meetings  
0.00166** 
(2.536549) 
0.001362** 
(2.262358) 
0.000607** 
(2.249728) 
Non-Ex  
-0.000396*** 
(2.823547) 
-0.000664*** 
(2.632948) 
-0.000215* 
(1.65079) 
Independent  
0.0000367 
(0.496534) 
0.000456*** 
(2.727048) 
0.0000841 
(0.353298) 
Total Debt (log) 
0.060193*** 
(8.694525) 
0.065186*** 
(13.43511) 
0.049071*** 
(11.93817) 
Total Assets (log) 
-0.07089*** 
(3.25264) 
-0.058185*** 
(6.25172) 
-0.031309*** 
(8.374035) 
Capex (log) 
0.007896** 
(2.237109) 
-0.000195 
(0.083052) 
0.003769** 
(2.246288) 
Free Float (log) 
-0.002247 
(0.46856) 
0.010427 
(1.575014) 
-0.003871* 
(1.679146) 
Sales Growth 
0.008455 
(1.530213) 
-0.003772 
(0.480296) 
-0.005952 
(1.336036) 
Dividend Yield 
0.0011 
(1.334671) 
0.000574** 
(1.274314) 
0.000133* 
(1.698766) 
Ebit Sales Ratio 
-0.047751*** 
(3.016256) 
-0.009231 
(0.473438) 
-0.103968*** 
(5.759677) 
Tobin’s Q (1 lag) 
0.287094*** 
(3.160955) 
0.423813*** 
(8.545759) 
0.275276*** 
(5.80866) 
Tobin’s Q (2 lag) 
-0.025718 
(0.462826) 
-0.096168*** 
(3.423204)  
    
C 
0.421083* 
(1.883061) 
0.15887 
(1.366448) 
0.003591 
(0.057483) 
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The results for three of the four board characteristic variables are confirmed: The size of 
the board exerts significant negative impacts on corporate performance for all 
geographic sub-samples. Hence, increasing the number of board members leads to 
inefficiencies such as higher costs, lower board dynamics and less effective decision-
making. Hereby, the effect is the highest for companies in Europe. Concerning meeting 
frequency, the results are similar for all regions: a significant positive effect indicating 
that companies in general profit from higher information exchange. Again, for European 
companies the performance implications are the highest. The number of non-executive 
board members has also a negative significant effect for all regions. As a result, for all 
examined regions, there must be more effective control mechanisms than the number of 
non-executive directors. Though, the independence of board members is positively 
correlated to the companies’ financial performance, the effect is only significant for the 
U.S. sample. Thus, only in the U.S. companies can increase their financial performance by 
increasing the number of independent directors. However, the overall results meet the 
goal to determine the explanatory power – thus the robustness – of the model. For the 
first three board determinants this can be confirmed. For board independence, the 
results vary also concerning geographical distribution. In addition, analyzing the first 
and second lag of board characteristics to determine whether the past board 
composition and determinants have an effect on corporate financial performance did 
neither show a significant effect nor improved the model fit (results are not tabulated). 
Consequently, the actual year governance performance has the above mentioned impact 
on the financial performance of a company, i.e. if companies want to influence their 
performance, they might change the board determinants of that year.  
  
Fixed Effects yes yes yes 
R² 0.9028 0.9056 0.9387 
# Observations 4,042 5,825 2,978 
 
Significance of coefficients are marked as *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 while t-values are given in 
parenthesis. 
Source: Own illustration. 
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4.6 Conclusion and discussion 
One of the main reasons for the increased attention to corporate governance and, in 
particular, to the composition of the board of directors has been the published corporate 
scandals of recent years (e.g. Volkswagen AG, Lehman Brothers and Enron). The 
consequence of all scandals is the same: financial losses for the shareholders, the state 
and the taxpayers.  
However, another reason for the increased attention is societies’ and investors’ 
increased appreciation of sustainability triggered by the threatening anthropogenic 
climate change and natural catastrophes. Since all sustainability dimensions interact 
they are equally important for one another. Consequently, corporate governance affects 
the other dimensions – social and environmental – if not paid attention to as the case of 
Volkswagen AG has demonstrated impressively. Hence, the right performance of the 
monitoring duties depends strongly on the effectiveness of the board of directors and 
has been addressed in an extensive number of research studies. In this context, the 
board of directors as a high performing team is in the center of attention, examining 
what combination and characteristics determine the best controlling and management 
of companies. Thus, the main question is: How should companies construct their board 
of directors to achieve best financial outcomes? 
The aim of this article is to find a possible answer to this question. It analyzes the 
performance implications of board of directors’ characteristics, in particular the board 
size, the board meeting frequency, the percentage of non-executive and independent 
board members on the corporate financial performance by examining a vast, global 
unbalanced panel data set of 2,976 companies over a period of 13 years. The results 
reveal the following:  
 
1) Large boards have negative effects on Tobin’s Q. 
 
Large corporate boards are inversely related to corporate financial performance 
approximated by Tobin’s Q. Hence, in line with major previous work, this study can 
confirm the negative financial impacts of large boards, i.e. large boards lead to lower 
monitoring and management efficiency, higher costs and less efficient information 
exchange that in turn result in lower financial performance. The results for this board 
determinant are stable and valid across different industries, company sizes and 
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geographical regions. Thus, lean board structures do prevent free riding tendencies, 
promote effective communication, speed-up decision-making processes, increase overall 
controlling activities and reduce costs of additional directors. Also, from the market 
performance view, i.e. investors’ perspective reflected in Tobin’s Q, companies with 
smaller boards are of higher value, revealing that smaller corporate boards are 
associated with better governance and shareholder value creation.  
 
2)  The real estate industry has specific governance needs. 
 
Also, for the real estate industry, large boards have a significant negative effect on 
corporate financial performance. Hence, concerning board size, the real estate sector 
does not have any special governance needs compared to other sectors. However, when 
taking other board characteristics into account, the real estate industry has its own 
divergent governance needs: For instance, financial performance does not improve with 
higher board of directors’ meeting frequency or increased number of non-executive 
directors, since both coefficients are not significant. In contrast to other sectors, real 
estate companies profit from decreasing number of independent board members. The 
reason for this might be the increased heterogeneity and controversies independent 
director bring resulting in slower decision-making and higher communication 
inefficiencies. Consequently, the results prove that there is not one governance concept 
that fits all companies.  
 
3) Smaller companies have a higher need for good governance. 
 
The results of the comparison between large and small companies – differentiated 
according to their total assets – revealed that smaller companies have a greater need for 
extensive internal governance mechanism such as the board of directors. The ordinary 
least squares regression results show that all four board determinants have a significant 
impact on the corporate financial performance. For large companies only the board size 
exhibit significant negative correlation to financial performance measures, i.e. with 
increasing board size companies experience financial drawbacks. The reason for these 
differences might root in different controlling mechanisms: For large companies the 
market, the public and the government itself serve as controlling mechanisms due to 
their exposure and their size. Smaller companies might make up for the lack of these 
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additional external governance mechanisms by increasing specific internal corporate 
governance. Hence, the meeting frequency and the number of independent board 
members support company performance positively while increased number of non-
executive board members has a rather negative effect.  
 
4) There is no one “good governance” concept. 
 
The above mentioned differing results for the various sub-samples suggest in contrast to 
major previous literature that there is no one “good governance” concept with general 
validity for all companies and industries. This study rather reveals that the governance 
needs depend on the sector the company is active in as well as the size of the company. 
Hence, in building the governance structure of the company, the management and 
shareholders have to pay attention to the specific governance needs arising out of the 
sector and the company itself. That is, before investing in increased numbers of 
independent or non-executive directors or higher board meeting frequencies, the 
company size and sector as well as the market conditions should be taken into 
consideration. This way the highest and best performance implications can be 
generated. For instance, the major previous literatures’ aspirations for increased 
number of non-executive board members and their positive performance effects might 
not be positive and significant for all companies and industries. The results find 
evidence that compared to the technology and industrial sector, utilities & consumer 
goods companies are only financially sensitive to changes in the board size. As a result, 
putting large efforts in increasing the meeting frequency or the number of non-executive 
or independent directors would not pay off for these companies. A reason for the 
divergence might be the special public control mechanisms of these companies, i.e. 
companies producing consumer goods target individuals and household and bad control 
mechanisms leading to hazardous effects for human beings or environment might be 
taken into account by the public much faster than other sectors. Where external control 
fail to be effective, companies need increasing internal governance mechanisms to 
ensure good corporate control. Hence, this study extends the current research results on 
board of directors to the extent that inflexible structures are not suiting all industries. 
Rather, every industry has its specific needs and therefore, overall comparability is not 
given, except for the overall agreement on the negative effects of large board sizes.  
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However, unlike previous research the magnitude of the effects is low. Therefore, these 
results should be interpreted with caution since one of the major shortcoming of 
empirical research concerning the link between board composition and corporate 
financial performance is endogeneity of board composition. Moreover, panel data 
analyses somehow always suffer from serial correlations making another potential 
source of errors. Therefore, potential new research areas could be the analysis of the 
effects on shareholder return, corporate risk or the usage of more sophisticated new 
analysis methods to determine the effects. Also, an industry in depths cross-section 
analysis might deliver further insights and extend this initial work.   
-109-  
 
4.7 References 
Adams, R., B. Hermalin, and M. Weisbach. 2010. The Role of Boards of Directors in 
Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework & Survey. Journal of Economic 
Literature 48:58-107.  
Adams, R. B. and Ferreira, D. (2009). Women in the boardroom and their impact on 
governance and performance. Journal of Financial Economics 94(2), 291-309.  
Agrawal, A. & Knoeber, C. (2001).Do Some Outside Directors Play a Political Role? 
Journal of Law and Economics 44(1), 179-198 
Bauer, R., Eichholtz, P. & Kok, N. (2010). Corporate governance and performance: the 
REIT effect. Real Estate Economics 38(1), 1-29. 
Bhagat, S., & Black, B. (2002). The non-correlation between board independence and 
long-term firm performance. Journal of Corporation Law 27(2), 231-273. 
Berle, A./Means, G. (1932), The Modern Corporation and Private Property, New York 
1932.  
Black, B. & Kim, W. (2012). The effect of board structure on firm value: A multiple 
identification strategies approach using Korean data. Journal of Financial Economics 
104(1), 203-226. 
Capozza, D. R. & Seguin, P. J. (2003). Inside Ownership, Risk Sharing and Tobin’s Q-
Ratios: Evidence from REITs. Real Estate Economics 31(3), 367-404. 
Carpenter, M. A., Geletkanycz, M. A. & Sanders, W. G. (2004). Upper Echelons research 
revisited: Antecedents, elements, and consequences of top management team 
composition. Journal of Management 30(6), 749-778. 
Carter, D. A., Simkins, B. J. and Simpson, W. G. (2003). Corporate Governance, Board 
Diversity, and Firm Value. The Financial Review 38(1), 33-53.  
Cheng, S. (2008). Board size and the variability of corporate performance. Journal of 
Financial Economics 87(1), 157–176.  
Claessens, S. (2006), Corporate governance and development, in: The World Bank 
Research Observer, Vol. 21, S. 91-122. 
-110-  
 
Coles, J. L., Lemmon, M. L. & Meschke, J. F. (2007). Structural Models and Endogeneity in 
Corporate Finance: The Link Between Managerial Ownership and Corporate Finance. 
Journal of Financial Economics 103(1), 149-168.  
Davis, B. J. & Shelor, R. M. (1995). Executive Compensation and financial performance in 
the real estate industry. The Journal of Real Estate Research 10(2), 141-151. 
Deutsch, Y., Keil, T. & Laamanen, T. (2010). A dual agency view of board compensation: 
The joint effects of outside director and CEO stock options on firm risk. Strategic 
Management Journal 32(2), 212-227. 
Dezsö, C. L., & Ross, D. G. 2012. Does female representation in top management improve 
firm performance? A panel data investigation. Strategic Management Journal, 33: 1072-
1089.  
Duchin, R., Matsusaka, J. G., & Ozbas, O. (2010). When are outside directors effective?. 
Journal of financial economics 96(2), 195-214. 
Edelstein, R., Qian, W., & Tsang, D. (2011). How do institutional factors affect 
international real estate returns?. The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 
43(1-2), 130-151. 
Easterwood, J. C., Ince, O. S. & Raheja, C. G. (2012). The evolution of board and CEOs 
following performance declines. Journal of Corporate Finance 18(4), 727-744. 
Fahlenbrach, R. Low, A. & Stulz, R. M. (2010). Why do firms appoint CEOs as outside 
directors?. Journal of Financial Economics 97(1), 12-32.  
Faleye, O. (2004). Are large boards poor monitors? Evidence from CEO turnover. 
Evidence from CEO Turnover. EFMA. 
Fich, E. M., & Shivdasani, A. (2006). Are busy boards effective monitors?. The Journal of 
Finance 61(2), 689-724. 
Florackis, C. & Ozkan, A. (2009). Managerial incentives and corporate leverage: Evidence 
from the United Kingdom. Accounting & Finance 49(3), 531-553.   
Fogel, K., Ma, L., & Morck, R. (2014). Powerful independent directors. No. w19809. 
National Bureau of Economic Research. 
-111-  
 
Friday, H. S. & Sirmans, G. S. (1998). Board of Director, Monitoring and Firm Value in 
REITs. Journal of Real Estate Research 16(3), 411-427. 
Gillan, S. L. & Starks, L. T. (2003). Corporate Governance, Corporate Ownership, and the 
Role of Institutional Investors: A Global Perspective. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.439500. 
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., and Metrick, A. (2003). Corporate Governance and Equity Prices. 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(1), 107-155. 
Guest, P. M. (2009). The impact of board size on firm performance: evidence from the 
UK. The European Journal of Finance 15(4), 385-404. 
Han, B. (2006). Insider ownership and firm value: Evidence from Real Estate Investment 
Trusts. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 32(4), 471-493. 
Harjoto, M., Laksmana, I. and Lee, R. (2015). Board Diversity and Corporate Social 
Responsibility. Journal of Business Ethics 132(4), 641-660.  
Hermalin, B. E.,& Weisbach, M. S. (1988). The Determinants of Board Composition. RAND 
Journal of Economics 19(4), 589–606. 
Hermalin, B. E.,& Weisbach, M. S. (1991). The Effects of Board Composition and Direct 
Incentives on FirmPerformance. Financial Management 20(4), 101–112. 
Hermalin, B. E.,& Weisbach, M. S. (1998). Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and 
Their Monitoring of the CEO. American Economic Review 88(1), 96–118. 
Hermalin, B. E.,& Weisbach, M. S. (2003). Boards of Directors as an Endogenously 
Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature. Economic Policy Review 
9(1), 7–26. 
Jensen, M.C./Meckling, W. H. (1976), Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure, in: Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3, S. 305-360. 
Joecks, J., Pull, K. & Vetter, K. (2013). Gender Diversity in the Boardroom and Firm 
Performance: What exactly constitutes a “critical mass”?. Journal of Business Ethics 
118(1), 61-72. 
-112-  
 
Johnson, S. G., Schnatterly, K. & Hill, A. D. (2013). Board Composition Beyond 
Independence: Social Capital, Human Capital, and Demographics. Journal of Management 
39(1), 232-262. 
Joshi, A., Liao, H. & Roh, H. (2011). Bridging domains in workplace demography 
research: a review and reconceptualization. Journal of Management 37(2), 521-552.  
Kohl, N. (2009), Corporate Governance and Market Valuation of Publicly Traded Real 
Estate Companies – A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, in: Schulte, K.-W./Bone-
Winkel, S. (Edt.): Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie, Band 50, Köln.   
Kor, Y. Y. & Sundaramurthy, C. (2009). Experience-based human capital and social 
capital of outside directors. Journal of Management 35(4), 981-1006. 
Krishnan, H. A. & Park, D. 2005. A few good women on top management teams. Journal 
of Business Research, 58: 1712-1720. 
Lipton, M. & Lorsch, J. W. (1992). A modest proposal for improved corporate 
governance, Business Lawyer 48(1), 59-77. 
McDonald, M. L., Westphal, J. D. & Graebner, M. E. (2008). What do they know? The 
effects of outside director acquisition experience on firm acquisition performance. 
Strategic Management Journal 29(11), 1155-1177.  
Pathan, S. (2009). Strong boards, CEO power and bank risk-taking. Journal of Banking & 
Finance 33(7), 1340-1350. 
Post, C. and Byron, K. (2015). Women on Boards and firm financial performance: A meta-
analysis. Academy of Management Journal,  
Raskop, J. (2004), Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex und Kapitalkosten, in: Fehl, 
U./Oberender, P./Leschke, M./Ulrich, V. (Edt.): Schriften zur Nationalökonomie, Band 
42, Bayreuth. 
Renders, A., Gaeremynck, A. & Sercu, P. (2010). Corporate Governance Ratings and 
Company Performance: A Cross European Study. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review 18(2), 87-106.  
-113-  
 
Sah, R. & Stiglitz, J. (1986). The architecture of economic systems: hierarchies and 
polyarchies. American Economic Review 76(4), 716–727.  
Sah, R. & Stiglitz, J. 1991. The quality of managers in centralized versus decentralized 
organizations. Quarterly Journal of Economics 106(1), 289–295.  
Schaefers, W./Kohl, N./Schulte, K.-W. (2008), Corporate Governance bei Real Estate 
Investment Trusts, in: Bone-Winkel, S./Schäfers, W./Schulte, K.-W. (Edt.): Handbuch 
Real Estate Investment Trusts, Köln, S. 234-249.  
Terjesen, S., Couto, E. B., & Francisco, P. M. (2016). Does the presence of independent 
and female directors impact firm performance? A multi-country study of board diversity. 
Journal of Management & Governance 20(3), 447-483. 
Vafeas, N. (1999). Board meeting frequency and firm performance. The Journal of 
Financial Economics 53(1), 113-142.   
Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of 
directors. Journal of financial economics 40(2), 185-211. 
 
 
-114-  
 
5 Conclusion 
Sustainable development is one of the major topics of the past two decades. However, 
due to its inflationary (mis-)use - since everything and everyone shall be sustainable –
the resulting wide range of definitions and interpretations led to sustainability being 
one of the most contested concepts. Different streams of understanding coined this 
development. On the one hand, consumers, investors or regulators become more and 
more conscious about fair working conditions, clean product value-chain or 
environmental protection requiring sustainability. This increasing demand for 
sustainability in turn increased pressure on the business world to achieve considerable 
improvements in all – environmental, social and governance – sustainability dimensions. 
On the other hand, a major part of the business world perceived sustainability as a cost-
effective marketing tool. The main answer was being sustainable in peripheral activities 
while in the background sticking to the old, conservative way of doing core business. For 
instance, companies started engaging in higher corporate philanthropy but went on 
exploiting workers in developing countries to push prices down and increase profit 
margins or accepted having high emissions but lower short-term costs in their core 
business. Hence, in other words, the external effects of their doing are still not 
internalized, but rather greenwashed by superficial sustainability efforts. One of the 
main reasons for this gap is that still too little is known about sustainability as a long-
term investment and whether it would pay-off on the long run with such advantages like 
increased customer loyalty, future competitiveness or cost optimization. Hence, 
sustainability advocates try to promote the link between sustainability and corporate 
(financial) advantages by emphasizing the view of sustainability as a long-term 
investment. A closer look at past research in this field reveals that in particular the real 
estate sector is not duly represented. Especially, considering this sector’s vast 
environmental, social as well as economic effects, it becomes clear, that further research 
in this field is needed. Hence, this work contributes to these aspirations by means of 
empirical and theoretical analysis. That is, in three articles comprising the main body of 
this work it analyzes how companies can generate (financial) advantages by being 
sustainable. This is undertaken at different company levels. The sustainability data 
sources from the global reporting initiative (GRI) database and Thomson Reuters 
Asset4ESG while the financial data is derived from Datastream. The following section 
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gives an overview of the main findings of the three articles and closes with some further 
remarks on potential areas for research.  
5.1 Executive summary 
The value contribution of sustainability reporting - an 
empirical evidence for real estate companies 
Ever since corporate reporting was a major part of stakeholder communication. 
However, in the course of time stakeholders’ needs for more information on the 
sustainability performance of companies increased, but annual reports or other 
regulatory files failed to satisfy these additional informational desires. Though, 
sustainability information is provided by some pioneering companies, the problem was 
that this information was lacking uniformity and thus comparability. As a result, the 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) developed frameworks for sustainability reports in 
order to ensure this lacking comparability and hence reduce information asymmetries. 
Also, the fact that each company’s sustainability reports are released by GRI ensured 
credibility and trust for potential investors. The main purpose of this article is to analyze 
whether the information provided in these sustainability reports are of decision-
usefulness and –relevance for investors. Thus, if sustainability disclosure provides 
information of decision usefulness to investors, higher (lower) sustainability disclosing 
companies are expected to have relatively higher (lower) abnormal stock returns. As 
such, by means of event study, the potential impacts of the event publication of 
sustainability report on the share price of the publishing company were analyzed over an 
event window of 120 days before and after the publication. This is in particular 
undertaken for a sample of real estate companies due to their specific sustainability 
responsibilities. Hence, this article is the first to analyze GRI data and the first to focus 
on the real estate sector. The results of an initial after-minus-before stock index 
distribution for 227 GRI publications over a time period 1999 till 2015 show that for 
about 70 % of the observations the index difference is positive. After 106 days, almost 
70 % of the publication observations reveal a positive index value between +0.6 and 
+3.7 %.  The main calculation of the abnormal returns cumulated for the sample over the 
event window confirms the initial descriptive results: 29 days after the release of the 
sustainability report, the listed real estate companies exhibit a cumulated abnormal 
return of at least 3 %. 70 days after release the CAR value is at least 1 %. The analysis of 
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the CAR across the disclosing companies revealed that for 90 % of the companies, the 
CAR targets at least 2.5 %. However, only 10 % of the sample companies generate a 
statistical significant CAR of at least 5 %. Combining the analysis over time and across 
the sample, the t-test reveals a significant CAR of up to 2 % for the whole sample. The 
implications of this analysis are manifold. For companies bearing the costs of disclosing 
sustainability reports, it is a confirmation of the expected positive returns. Furthermore, 
it is also a confirmation of their sustainability focus itself. From the investors’ point of 
view, sustainability reports do contain valuable information about the companies and 
thus can be anticipated in investment decisions. From the sustainability frameworks 
providers’ view – the GRI – the framework is appreciated by the market participants as 
well as by the companies. For the whole real estate sector, the results are an incentive 
that there is demand for more sustainable corporate management. Thus, for non-
disclosing real estate companies these results might be a further incentive to start 
disclosing sustainability information and going along with this – to invest increasingly in 
sustainability.  
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Management diversity and superior corporate environmental 
performance – a global longitudinal analysis with special 
evidence for the real estate industry 
Modern times have pledged for gender equality out of ethically and socially motivated 
reasons or out of value-increasing effects, diversity is assumed to promote from an 
economical point of view. However, besides the direct positive financial effects, it is also 
assumed that gender diverse teams increase the sustainability performance of 
companies and by this enhance directly and/or indirectly the corporate financial 
performance. Especially, for sectors with high environmental impact like the real estate 
and construction industry, it might be a benefit to improve gender diversity and by this 
the corporate environmental sustainability performance.  
However, no matter what argumentation line is chosen to promote gender equality, in 
practice the threat of tokenism is still prevalent: It results out of superficial gender 
diversity and equality implementation attempts. Concerning the business world, 
tokenism takes place on different level. As an answer to widespread legislative 
regulations requiring higher number of female board directors via quotas, companies 
started appointing women on the board of directors. However, for the majority of the 
business world, these attempts ended with having one woman on the board of directors 
– the token woman. In this context, research has proven that minorities fail to promote 
the positive effects actually intended with diversity. Thus, tokenism takes place. 
Nonetheless, there are companies with gender parity on board level. But, in fact, having 
gender parity on board level but no women on key decision-making management 
positions also results in tokenism. This is the so called double-tokenism effect, the basis 
for this article’s argumentation. Therefore, the aim of this work is to analyze the link 
between environmental sustainability and management diversity besides board level 
diversity. The reason for this is the assumption that the benefits of gender diversity can 
only be achieved if diversity is a part of the corporate culture, integrated at all 
important, decision-making management level. Hence, if empirical evidence can prove 
the benefits of gender parity on board subordinated management level, than this is the 
best argument for gender diversity in organizations.  
Initial descriptive statistics of various sub-samples show that real estate and 
construction companies have on average the lowest number of female managers (6.48 
%), while the highest percentage of female managers are employed at the financial and 
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insurance sector (11.08 %). Though, considering that by definition gender parity equals 
50 % female managers, all sectors suffer from excessive backlog.  
The results for the total sample confirm the positive effects of gender diversity in 
decision-making management positions on the corporate environmental sustainability 
performance, i.e. a 10 % increase in female managers results in a 0.6450 % higher total 
environmental sustainability performance, ceteris paribus. This positive correlation is 
the highest for the environmental product innovation sub-category (ENPI). Thus, 
holding other effects constant, a 10 % increase in female manager results in a 1.782 % 
increase in product innovativeness concerning environment, i.e. female managers 
predominantly promote the development of eco-efficient products and services, thereby 
increasing the product innovation abilities of a company. Furthermore, analysis of 
companies with at least 10 % female managers even reveals that the positive 
environmental sustainability increasing effects is for the environmental product 
innovation category about 47 % (1.5 times) higher compared to the total sample. As 
such, a 10 % increase in female manager results in a 2.62 % increase in the 
environmental product innovation score, keeping all other effects fixed. For the total 
sample, the value increase is about 1.78 %, ceteris paribus. In all regressions, the 
variable board diversity is ought to control for board level diversity. The results show 
consistently that management diversity has a higher impact compared to board level 
diversity, further confirming the assumption of tokenism on board level.  
Concerning sub-sample analysis, in particular, the real estate and construction sector is 
suspected to have devastating strong effects on the environment. Thus, the special focus 
of the second part of the analysis is the examination of the correlations for this sector. 
The results indicate that gender diversity in decision-making management level has 
even higher positive impacts for real estate and construction companies compared to 
the total sample. For instance, a 10 % increase in women on management positions 
results in a 1.44 % increase in the overall environmental sustainability score. Hence, 
compared to the total sample, real estate companies have 2.23 times higher effect of 
gender diversity in decision-making positions, though this result is not significant at 
common significant level. However, the highest and most significant effect of gender 
diversity on management level can be reached for the environmental emission reduction 
score, ENER. For real estate companies, a 10 % increase in female managers results in a 
1.638 % increase in the environmental emission reduction sub-score, ceteris paribus.  
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Various robustness tests are conducted to examine whether the results hold under 
different conditions. In an initial step, the correlation between employee diversity as a 
proxy for management diversity with environmental performance is performed. The 
results confirm the initial values for Envscore as well as vor ENPI.  Also, the analysis of a 
non-financial sub-sample and the geographical region of developed European countries 
confirm the majority of the results. Thus, in practice, companies in general can benefit 
from gender parity on management level, since it increases environmental sustainability 
performance, which in turn is expected to increase financial performance indirectly.  
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Determinants of board of directors and corporate performance 
with special evidence for the real estate industry 
The principles of responsible corporate management and control, and the optimal 
implementation thereof have always been important for research and practice. 
Considering the corporate failures and scandals of the past decades (e.g. Lehman 
Brothers, Enron, Volkswagen AG), corporate governance seems to be more topical than 
ever. As a cornerstone of the three sustainability dimensions – social, environment and 
governance - a large bulk of research has been dedicated to the possible implications of 
variations in corporate governance. In this context, the board of directors as an internal 
governance mechanism to control and manage the company in the best interests of the 
shareholders has involved scholars intensely. However, research results on the best 
combination and design of the board of directors to increase corporate financial 
performance has still been ambiguous. Hence, by extending previous research to the 
following new dimensions, this article’s objective is to close research gaps and obtain 
valuable insights for the practice. As such, the focus has been on the usage of raw level 
data instead of the common dichotomous or ratio approach in governance research to 
determine the performance implications of a set of four board attributes which are in 
particular the size of the board, the annual frequency of board meetings and the 
percentage of non-executive and independent board members. The results of the 
ordinary least squares regression analysis with panel data comprising a period of 13 
years reveal interesting insights into corporate governance needs of different sectors 
and companies. The examination of the correlation between board of directors 
attributes and corporate financial performance measured by Tobin’s Q – reflecting the 
market-based financial performance – show that board size is negatively correlated with 
financial performance. This result holds for all company types, all sectors, geographical 
regions as well as company sizes and confirms the results of previous research (e.g. 
Yermack, 1996). When it comes to the other attributes – board meeting frequency, 
percentage of non-executive and independent board members – the results indicate that 
there is no one “governance concept” fitting all companies in all sectors to result in 
positive financial performance. In fact, the results vary with regard to the chosen sub-
sample. Hence, concerning the analysis of different sub-samples, the results show that 
the utilities & consumer goods sector has the least sensitivity to changes in the board of 
directors. Besides the inverse effect of board size, neither the board meeting frequency, 
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nor the percentage of non-executive and independent board members has a significant 
effect. In contrast to this, the technology and industrial sector are significantly affected 
by changes in these board characteristics. Besides board size effects that are for all sub-
samples similar, technology companies benefit financially, when the percentage of 
independent board members increases and that of non-executive board members 
decreases. The meeting frequency is irrelevant to financial performance. The real estate 
and construction sector is placed the second when it comes to financial sensitivity to 
board room changes. Besides board size, only the percentage of independent board 
members has a negative significant impact on Tobin’s Q. In contrast to this, for industrial 
companies there is a significant positive link between board meeting frequency and 
percentage of non-executive directors. Also, the independence of directors has no 
financial implications for industrial sector due to insignificance. A possible explanation 
for this divergence might root in the varying degrees of external control exercised by 
governmental regulations, consumer protection laws or capital markets. However, 
sector-specific results provide evidence for sector-individual governance needs. The 
analysis of different company size confirms the assumption: There is no one governance 
concept fitting all companies. The results show that smaller companies are more 
sensitive to board of director characteristics than large companies, i.e. all four board 
characteristics have significant impact on Tobin’s Q. A possible explanation is that 
external control (financial markets, governmental regulations, investors’ desires, public 
pressure etc.) are higher for large companies.  Practical implications of these results are 
that companies need to specifically consider the corporate environment before deciding 
to make any changes to the board of directors, since there is no one board concept fitting 
all. This also holds for the real estate and construction sector largely assumed as an 
industry with high governance needs.  
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5.2 Final remarks and further research 
"Change can happen if we all live like we’d like the change." 
- Al Gore -  
Increasing global temperatures, melting ice caps, floods, draughts, natural resource 
scarcity and pollution, exploitation of the poor and speechless for the higher comfort of 
the rich and developed, growing gap between poor and rich, global financial crises, 
employee exploitation etc. – the list seems to be endless and indicates the current 
generations’ inheritance for future mankind. Though, this might sound trite, but fact is: 
the world is desperate for change since a business as usual is more inappropriate and 
dangerous than ever. Thus, it is no surprise that sustainable development is one of the 
major challenges of this century. As corporations are identified as one of the main 
contributors to the aforementioned developments, in particular, Corporate Social 
Responsibility – the business worlds’ contribution to sustainable development – is in the 
center of awareness. But sustainability cannot work without the will for change: This 
means the pursuit for change in the way of doing business, i.e. the change in the way of 
thinking towards a more environmental and social consciousness, instead of short-term 
“dash for cash” economic solutions.  
In other words, it is important for corporations to change the still widely prevalent 
thinking that sustainability is a marketing tool, something you pretend to be committed 
to in order to gain customer trust and governmental license to operate. Hence, in order 
to trigger deliberate change, we need proof. Underpinning empirical research might 
shed some light in the long-term direct and indirect financial benefits of the conscious 
way of doing business. As altruism is no choice, what can be a larger incentive than 
financial benefits of sustainability? Therefore, this work’s aim is to address the financial 
benefits of sustainability beyond ‘greenwashing’, i.e. sustainability implemented in the 
core business. Hence, the direct and indirect financial implications of different aspects of 
Corporate Social Responsibility are examined in three articles. The results could show 
for parts of this huge topic that all three dimensions of sustainability – environmental, 
social and governance – can generate positive outcomes for the business world. So, the 
question whether sustainability does pay-off, can be affirmed as a consequence of this 
work’s results.  
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Nonetheless, as for any other empirical research, the restricted simplification and 
exemplariness of reality modeling always entails distortions. Thus, this research might 
be a beginning point for further work in this field. Since, the Asset4ESG database 
provides sophisticated and comprehensive data on corporate sustainability; it can be 
used to further explore the impacts of corporate environmental and social sustainability 
on corporate risk, measured, for example, as the standard deviations of stock returns. 
Furthermore, another interesting approach would be the merger of different 
sustainability ratings to gain a holistic and far-reaching rating and consequently, in 
depth results on implications of corporate sustainability performance. Also, an aspect of 
interest would be the explicit data gathering on decision-making management positions 
besides the board level. This is still a neglected area with large shortcomings concerning 
various important value-driving characteristics such as age, work experience or 
education. Also, it would be interesting to analyze the effects of gender diversity, 
environmental sustainability and corporate governance on future corporate 
performance, i.e. a forward-oriented research approach.  
All in all, change can only take place and initiate progress, if it finds true supporters who 
act accordingly. Especially, corporate practice needs to take empirical results on the 
benefits of sustainability seriously and trigger change towards a more sustainable and 
conscious business-making in the organization. In this context, leaders in all decision-
making positions can be a role model for the wanted positive change. In the long-term, 
this is maybe the only way how current generations could pave the way for future 
mankind. 
 
 
 
 
 
